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Abstract
We study the eﬀects of tax enforcement policies on firm behavior in Spain. Firms
with more than €6 million in reported revenue are monitored by the Large Taxpayers’
Unit (LTU), which results in more frequent tax audits and more information require-
ments for those firms. We exploit this discontinuity in tax enforcement intensity to
estimate the impact of diﬀerent enforcement regimes on firms’ reporting behavior, us-
ing financial statements from almost the universe of Spanish firms for the period 1999-
2007. An excess mass of firms locates, or “bunches”, just below the revenue threshold.
Using bunching estimation techniques, we calculate that the marginal firm reduces its
reported revenue by up to 7.5% to avoid falling in the high enforcement regime. A
dynamic analysis shows that firm’s revenue growth rates decline substantially as firms
approach the LTU threshold from below. We provide suggestive evidence that firms lo-
cating below the threshold also misreport their material and labor input costs to evade
taxes.
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1 Introduction
Firms remit more than three-quarters of the tax revenues raised by governments in advanced
economies.1 Despite playing such a crucial role as fiscal intermediaries, the empirical liter-
ature on tax evasion has largely neglected firms, focusing instead on individual cheating
behavior.2 Absent perfect tax monitoring, the information asymmetry between businesses
and tax authorities gives firms incentives to misreport their own income, and also third
party’s income, in order to evade taxes.
This paper takes advantage of a policy discontinuity to analyze how tax enforcement
policies (i.e., tax audits and compliance requirements) aﬀect firms’ reporting and production
decisions. In 1995, the Spanish tax agency established a Large Taxpayers’ Unit (LTU)
to monitor and enforce the taxation of companies with annual operating revenues above €6
million.3 Firms assigned to the LTU are subject to more frequent tax audits and information
cross-checking by the tax authority, while the tax schedules is the same on either side of
the threshold. This discontinuity in tax enforcement intensity gives tax-evading firms an
incentive to remain below the revenue threshold. They can do this either by reducing their
output or by underreporting their revenue or a combination of both reactions. In this paper,
we first estimate the size of the total reported revenue response and then we examine whether
firms’ reaction is due to an adjustment in real production or to revenue misreporting, which
implies tax evasion.
To guide the empirical estimation, we set up a theoretical framework where profit maxi-
mizing firms decide (i) how much to produce and (ii) how much of their revenue to underre-
port in order to reduce their tax liability. Firms receive a productivity draw that determines
their optimal size in equilibrium. The available enforcement technology available yields a
probability of evasion detection that is continuously increasing in firm size and in the amount
evaded. This reflects the intuition that larger firms are more visible to the tax authority,
and that egregious evasion is easily detectable. We introduce the concept of a LTU in the
model by allowing the detection probability to jump up discretely at a fixed level of reported
revenue. This generates a notch in tax enforcement, meaning that the probability of detec-
tion increases discontinuously when a firm crosses the threshold.4 The existence of the notch
1In the United States, for example, businesses remit 84 percent of taxes (Christensen et al., 2001).
2Slemrod (2004, 2008) has repeatedly stressed the relevance of firms in the analysis of tax evasion.
3Firms in the LTU represent only 2.5% of all registered business, but they employ 50% of private sector
workers and report 75% of taxable profits (AEAT, Several years). Most tax agencies in advanced countries,
and an increasing number of emerging countries, have some type of LTU to deal with large businesses (see
IMF, 2002 and OECD, 2011).
4See Slemrod (2010) for a formal definition of notches in tax schedules and regulations.
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drives some firms to report lower revenue and bunch at the LTU threshold to avoid high tax
enforcement. We define the “marginal buncher” as the firm with the highest productivity
draw that chooses to bunch at the cutoﬀ point.
In the empirical analysis, we use financial statements and balance-sheet data from Amadeus.
This database compiles information reported by firms to the Commercial Registry, covering
more than 80% of registered businesses in Spain with operating revenue between €3 and
€10 million for the period 1999-2011 (see Table 6 for details). The longitudinal structure of
the dataset allows us to analyze the dynamic behavior of firms. An advantage of this data
source over administrative tax returns is that it provides information on firms’ choices in
several dimensions, such as input costs, allowing us to examine the impact of multiple taxes
in a single data source.5
To estimate the firms’ response to a discontinuity in tax enforcement intensity, we analyze
the empirical distribution of reported operating revenue in Spain. As predicted by the model,
a significant number of firms bunch below the LTU threshold. This behavioral response is
strong and persistent over time for the boom period (1999-2007), but becomes much smaller
in the recession period (2008-2011). The evidence indicates that the bunching response is
due exclusively to the existence of the LTU, not to other regulations aﬀecting firms in the
same size range such as tax incentives for small firms.
We construct a counterfactual revenue distribution and use it to estimate the excess
bunching mass in a short interval below the threshold. We then use this excess mass as a
suﬃcient statistic for the reported revenue response of the marginal buncher. Despite the
notch in enforcement, many firms report revenues just above the LTU threshold, suggesting
the existence of optimization frictions. We use the missing mass in an interval above the
threshold (where the bunching firms would have located in the absence of the policy) as a
proxy for the degree of optimization frictions. Dividing the original bunching estimator by
this proxy, we obtain a treatment-on-the-treated estimator of the total revenue response.
For the boom period 1999-2007, we estimate that the marginal buncher reduces its re-
ported revenue by €86,000 (1.4% of total reported revenue) under the assumption of no
optimization frictions, and €449,000 (7.5% of total reported revenue) once frictions are
taken into account. This is a sizable response, considering that average reported profits
around the LTU threshold are €290,000 (4.5% of revenue). The estimates are significantly
5In order to perform our empirical tests using administrative data, we would need tax returns from the
corporate income tax, the value added tax, and social security contributions. It is rare for researchers to
have access to all these sources of information simultaneously, and especially to be able to link them (since
administrative datasets are often anonymized).
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smaller for the recession period 2008-2011, where the “no frictions” estimate is €26,000 and
the “frictions” estimate is €384,000.
There is heterogeneity in the bunching response across diﬀerent groups of firms. Bunching
is somewhat stronger among firms that are small in non-revenue dimensions such as fixed
assets or number of employees. Across sectors of activity, there is an inverted-U relationship
between the size of the response in a given sector and a “scope of evasion” index that takes into
account the median number of employees and the share of output sold to final consumers in
each sector. There is also wide regional variation, with the strongest bunching in the Central
and Southern regions and the smallest in the North-East.
To complement our static bunching analysis we also analyze the dynamic behavior of
firms. Growing firms, defined as those reporting higher revenue in the current year than
last year, are much more likely to bunch at the threshold than shrinking firms, which barely
respond. The probability of revenue growth and the median growth rate drop significantly
as firms approach the threshold from below. Moreover, the probability to remain in the same
€250,000-wide revenue bin for two consecutive years almost doubles for firms just below the
threshold compared to the counterfactual.
To better understand whether firms’ reaction to the tax enforcement discontinuity is due
to real or evasion responses, we extend the stylized model of firm behavior to include two
production inputs, labor and materials, that can be misreported. Each type of input leads
to diﬀerent fiscal incentives: materials are deductible under both the corporate income tax
(CIT) and the value added tax (VAT), so it is always advantageous to overreport them to
evade taxes. In contrast, labor costs are not deductible under the VAT but they are taxed
through the payroll tax (PRT). The incentives for a tax-evading firm regarding labor costs are
therefore ambiguous from this perspective, depending on the marginal tax rates on the CIT
and the PRT. However, the existence of downward nominal wage rigidities and uncertainty
about future demand conditions make it reasonable to assume that a tax-evading firm has
incentives to underreport labor costs.
We use this model extension to derive testable predictions about the behavior of reported
input costs around the LTU threshold. When bunching is due to a real response, the model
predicts an upward jump in reported input costs at the threshold (that is, firms just below
the threshold report less labor and material inputs than firms just above). This follows
from the fact that bunching firms have higher productivity and the production function is
concave, so bunching firms need fewer inputs to produce the same output as other firms.
When bunching is due to tax evasion, the model predicts a downward jump in reported
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material inputs at the LTU threshold. This is due to bunching firms producing more output
(and hence using more inputs) than they report. Since we expect bunching firms to also
overreport their material inputs, the jump will be even more pronounced. In contrast, the
model predicts a downward jump in reported labor costs, for exactly the opposite reasons.
We compare the predictions of the model with empirical patterns by showing plots of
the ratio of reported inputs costs (materials, labor) over revenue against reported revenue.
Using ratios rather than levels helps to identify discontinuities at the LTU threshold. In the
boom period, we find a significant downward jump in average reported material inputs (as a
percentage of revenue) at the threshold, from about 66% to 64.5%, meaning that firms just
below report proportionally more material inputs than firms just above. Such a pattern is at
odds with the predictions of the model where bunching is due to real responses. We also find
an upward jump in reported labor costs at the threshold, from 15% to 16% of revenue. Most
of this discontinuity in reported labor expenses is due to firms below the threshold reporting
lower average wages than firms above, while they report a similar number of employees. The
patterns observed for reported labor inputs seems to point to evasion responses, whereby
bunching firms underreport their employees’ wages (to evade payroll taxes) so that their
reported labor costs are lower than those of firms above the threshold. Overall, the graphical
evidence rules out the hypothesis that bunching is due entirely to a real response. However,
the evidence is not enough to prove that it is all due to evasion, nor can we disentangle the
importance of revenue vs. input cost misreporting.
The findings in this paper contribute to the scarce empirical literature on business tax
evasion by providing a well-identified measure of the eﬀects of tax enforcement on firm behav-
ior. Recent research by De Paula and Scheinkman (2010) and Pomeranz (2013) emphasizes
the role of information for eﬀective tax enforcement, particularly in the presence of self-
enforcing mechanisms related to the VAT.6 While Pomeranz (2013) concludes that having
a paper trail of transactions is complementary to tax audits, our results suggest that audits
are necessary for paper trails to be useful in tax enforcement.
The empirical techniques used below draw on a recent literature in public finance that
analyzes agents’ responses to thresholds in taxes and regulations. The seminal paper is Saez
(2010), but our empirical strategy draws mostly on the work of Kleven and Waseem (2013),
who exploit income thresholds at which the average tax rate jumps to identify taxable income
elasticities.7 The novel feature of our setting within this literature is that the LTU generates
6In fiscal systems with a VAT, the transmission of evasion (or compliance) behavior moves upwards the
production chain from retailers to intermediate goods suppliers.
7Saez (2010) exploits kink points in the US personal income tax schedule – i.e., income thresholds at
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a notch in the probability of evasion detection, rather than the tax rate (which is unaﬀected
in this setting), allowing us to study the eﬀect of tax enforcement in isolation.
This paper is also related to the recurring challenge in tax enforcement policy of how to
eﬀectively monitor small businesses. Evasion becomes riskier and more costly to firms as
they get bigger, because they need sophisticated accounting systems to carry out complex
operations. This facilitates the tax agency’s task of obtaining information from large firms8
(Kleven et al., 2009). Such information-related constraints on tax evasion are much weaker in
the case of small businesses, which represent the vast majority of firms.9 This is particularly
relevant in the Spanish case, where average firm size is small given the country’s level of
development.10 Since the expected return from a tax audit grows more than proportionally
with firm size, Dharmapala et al. (2011) make the theoretical argument that it may be
optimal for tax agencies with limited resources to focus all their enforcement eﬀorts on large
firms.
Finally, our paper contributes to the extensive literature on firm size distribution11 and
size-contingent policies.12 This literature focuses on the productivity consequences of having
a distorted firm size distribution with too many small firms. One of our contributions is
to point out that some firms may look smaller in the data than they actually are due to
misreporting. A closely-related paper is Onji (2009), who studies how Japanese responded
to the introduction of a VAT by trying to remain under the VAT eligibility threshold.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical frame-
work to guide our empirical analysis. Section 3 provides some institutional background on
tax enforcement policies in Spain and describes the dataset. Section 4 presents the static
empirical analysis, including a derivation of the bunching parameters. Section 5 presents the
dynamic empirical analysis. Section 6 explores real and evasion components of the response
of firms. Section 7 discusses the welfare implications of the results. Section 8 concludes.
which the marginal tax rate jumps – to identify taxable income elasticities. Several recent studies Chetty
et al. (2011, 2012); Bastani and Selin (2012) apply Saez’s method to derive taxable income elasticities using
large administrative datasets from Denmark, Sweden and the United States. Devereux et al. (2013) also use
bunching techniques to estimate the elasticity of corporate taxable income in the United Kingdom.
8On the other hand, large firms tend to spend more resources to hire top accountants and lawyers to
maximize legal tax avoidance.
9The exact percentage depends on the country and the precise definition of what constitutes a small firm.
10The share of small firms seems to be positively correlated with the size of the underground economy
across countries. Schneider et al. (2010) estimate that the underground economy accounts for approximately
25% of GDP in Greece, Italy and Spain, where the firm size distribution is skewed towards small family
firms. This is high compared to about 15% in France and Germany, and less than 10% in the United States,
where firms are larger on average.
11To name just a couple, Lucas (1978), Cabral and Mata (2003).
12Some examples are ? and Restuccia and Rogerson (2008).
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2 Theoretical Framework
We model the problem of a profit-maximizing firm that can choose to evade part of its tax
liabilities, at the risk of paying a penalty if it gets caught. The basic setup extends the classic
individual tax evasion framework (e.g., Allingham and Sandmo, 1972) to firms. We enrich
this framework by endogenizing the probability of detection, making it depend on firm size
and on the amount of evasion.
2.1 Setup
Consider an economy with a continuum of firms of measure one. Firms produce good y
using inputs m according to the production function y = ψf(m), where ψ is an idiosyncratic
productivity parameter distributed over the range [ψ,ψ] with probability density function
(pdf) h0(ψ). The production function exhibits positive but decreasing returns to material
inputs (fm > 0, fmm < 0). All markets are competitive, so firms purchase inputs at price c
and sell all their output at price p (which we normalize to 1 for simplicity). There is no entry
or exit of firms, such that in equilibrium all firms with ψ > ψ can sustain positive profits.
The government sets a proportional tax t on profits, so after-tax profits are given by
Π = (1− t) [ψf(m)− cm]. Assuming that tax evasion is not possible, profit maximization
yields the standard condition:
ψfm
(
mNoEv
)
= c (1)
where mNoEv is the optimal input use when there is no evasion. Given the definition of y, this
defines optimal true production yNoEv = ψif
(
mNoEv
)
. The proportional tax on profits does
not distort production eﬃciency in this simple partial equilibrium setting. Firms optimize
production as they would without taxation, but they now transfer part of their profits to
the government.
Now assume that firms can evade taxes by underreporting their revenue, which reduces
their tax liability. Let u ≡ y − y denote the amount of revenue underreported, where y is
reported revenue. We assume that input costs are always reported truthfully, so reported
profits are given by Π = (1− t) [y − cm]. The tax agency detects tax evasion with probability
δ ∈ (0, 1), which is endogenously determined as we explain below. We think of δ as the audit
probability, and we make the simplifying assumption that evasion is always detected if there
is an audit. When evasion is detected, a penalty rate θ is applied on the total amount
evaded, and after-tax profits are given by ΠD = (1 − t)Π − θt[Π − Π]. If no evasion is
detected, after-tax profits are ΠND = Π− tΠ.
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We can then write expected after-tax profits as follows:
EΠ = (1− δ)ΠND + δΠD
= (1− t)Π+ tu [1− δ (1 + θ)] . (2)
2.2 Benchmark Case
Let the probability of detection δ = δ (u,m) be a continuous and strictly monotonic function
of evasion and true input use. We assume that δm (u,m) > 0 (which implies δy (u, y) >
0 because the production function is monotonically increasing), to capture the intuition
that larger firms are more visible and hence more likely to be audited by the tax agency.13
Additionally, we assume that δu (u,m) > 0, which has two important implications. First,
firms face a trade-oﬀ between the benefits of evasion (lower tax payments) and the increased
probability of detection. Second, the tax agency’s enforcement strategy is influenced by the
reporting behavior of firms. One way to motivate this assumption is to consider commonly
used “relative audit rules”, under which tax agencies use aggregate information obtained
from firms in similar markets to identify suspicious behavior (Bayer and Cowell, 2009). For
example, a company operating in a booming industry that reports negative profits is very
likely to be audited because it stands out from its peers.14
The probability of detection is common knowledge. To ensure that the probability is
bounded, we further assume that limu→0 δ (u, y) = 0 and limu→y δ (u, y) =
1
1+θ . The latter
condition implies that the detection technology is not perfect, because even when a firm
reports zero revenue there is no certainty that it will be detected. This assumption is also
convenient to rule out corner solutions and ensure that all firms have a positive amount of
underreporting in equilibrium. We assume that δ (u,m) is locally convex in the neighborhood
of yLTU , i.e. δuu
(
u,m|y¯ ≈ yLTU
)
> 0.
Firms simultaneously make production (m) and reporting (u) decisions to maximize
expected profits. Optimal conditions for an interior optimum are given by:
ψfm (m
∗) = c + u
[
t
1− t
]
[1 + θ] δm (u,m
∗) (3)
1 = [1 + θ] [δ (u∗, m) + u∗ · δu (u
∗, m)] (4)
13The idea of an endogenous probability of detection that depends positively on the amount evaded was
first introduced by Reinganum and Wilde (1985).
14Notice that this type of audit rule provides “good” incentives, because firms are better oﬀ reporting
higher profits in order to avoid tax audits, holding all else equal.
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Condition (3) is similar to the standard optimality condition (1), but with an additional
positive term on the right-hand side. This term accounts for the fact that higher production
increases the probability of detection. Since u ≥ 0 by definition, in an interior optimum we
obtain that m∗ < mNoEv, which implies y∗ < yNoEv. In the corner solution where u∗ = 0,
condition (3) reduces to (1). Comparative statics are intuitive: optimal input use m∗ is
larger when (i) its eﬀect on the detection probability is weaker (i.e., δm(u,m) is smaller), (ii)
the tax rate t or the penalty θ are lower, and (iii) the equilibrium amount of underreported
revenue u∗ is smaller.
Condition (4) equates the expected marginal benefit of an additional unit of evasion to the
expected marginal cost. Firms optimally choose to underreport sales as long as δ (1 + θ) < 1,
which we assumed above. Comparative statics show that optimal evasion u∗ is higher when
(i) the penalty rate θ is lower, and (ii) the probability of detection δ is lower.15
The analysis above shows that, when enforcement policies respond endogenously to firms’
production and reporting decisions, such policies will in turn aﬀect firm behavior. Compared
to the situation with no evasion, firms produce less output and engage in revenue under-
reporting. These results are qualitatively similar to those obtained by Bayer and Cowell
(2009) in a model where they explicitly introduce relative audit rules. Since the production
and cost functions are the same for all firms, each firm’s optimal size in equilibrium depends
uniquely on their idiosyncratic productivity level ψ. It can be shown that if the productiv-
ity distribution h0 (ψ) is smoothly decreasing in its full domain
[
ψ,ψ
]
, then there exists a
density function g0 (·) such that the distribution of firms’ operating revenue, g0 (y∗) is also
smoothly decreasing in its full domain
[
y∗
(
ψ
)
, y∗
(
ψ
)]
.16
15We apply the Implicit Function Theorem to do the comparative statics of an increase in the probability
of detection. Let F (u, δ) ≡ d
du
EΠ = 1− [1 + θ] [δ + u∗ · δu (u∗,m)]. Then:
du
dδ
|u=u∗ = −
dF/dδ
dF/du
|u=u∗
= −
1 + θ
[1 + θ] [δu + δu + u∗δuu]
|u=u∗
= −
1
2δu + u∗δuu
|u=u∗
< 0, since δu, δuu > 0.
16The specific mapping between the two density functions depends on the functional forms of the produc-
tion function f (m) and the probability of detection δ (u,m).
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2.3 Policy Intervention: Large Taxpayers’ Unit (LTU)
Assume now that the tax agency sets up a Large Taxpayers’ Unit that monitors and enforces
the taxation of firms with reported revenue higher than yLTU . Dharmapala et al. (2011) pro-
vide a theoretical rationale for the existence of this type of institution when the tax agency’s
resources are limited. In their model, the trade-oﬀ between the tax agency’s administrative
costs of enforcement and its tax collection goals yields an optimal threshold below which
firms should be exempted from taxation.17 They argue that the full exemption for small
businesses exists de facto in most developing countries via lenient tax enforcement.
The probability of detection is no longer a continuous function of reported revenue. It
remains the same for firms below the revenue cutoﬀ and jumps discretely at the revenue
threshold yLTU . Hence, the detection probability is strictly higher for all firms above the
threshold and given by:
δ =
⎧⎨
⎩δ (u,m) , if y ≤ y
LTU
δLTU ≡ r · δ (u,m) , if y > yLTU
where, r > 1. We assume that δ (·) is locally convex at yLTU such that the optimal conditions
(3) and (4) continue to hold for firms with y¯ ≤ yLTU .
The introduction of the LTU generates a “notch” in δ, meaning that the probability of de-
tection increases for all inframarginal units evaded when a firm crosses the (reported) revenue
threshold. We assume that firms face no optimization frictions (we relax this assumption
later), so they can re-optimize to new levels of production and reporting in response to the
new policy. The pre-reform and post-reform revenue distributions are depicted in Figure 2,
where they are labeled “counterfactual” and “observed” density, respectively, to be consistent
with the terminology of the empirical section.
To study the response of diﬀerent types of firms to the policy change, we define three
distinct groups. First, there are low productivity firms, defined as those that report revenue
y∗ ≤ yLTU in the benchmark case. Nothing changes for these firms with the new policy
because they are not LTU-eligible, so their behavior continues to be defined by optimality
conditions (3) and (4). We denote by ψL the productivity level of the firm that chooses
exactly y∗ = yLTU in the benchmark case (without LTU). Hence, all firms with ψi ∈
[
ψ,ψL
]
belong to the “low productivity” group.
17The threshold in Dharmapala, Slemrod and Wilson (2011) involves changes in both tax liability and
enforcement, whereas in our setting only the enforcement intensity changes.
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Second, there is a group of firms whose pre-reform reported revenue was just above yLTU .
These firms react to the reform by reporting lower revenue in order to locate exactly, or
“bunch”, at the LTU threshold, i.e. y¯∗∗ = yLTU (we denote the optimal choices in the LTU
case with two stars, to distinguish them from optimal choices in the benchmark case, which
had one star). This bunching response is a combination of lower production and higher
evasion, where the relative importance of each action depends on the functional forms of
f (m) and δ (u,m). We define the “marginal buncher” as the firm with the highest exogenous
productivity that chooses y∗∗ = yLTU . We denote by ψMB the exogenous productivity of
the marginal buncher. Formally, ψMB is the unique value that equalizes expected profits
when facing the low probability of detection (δ) an expected profits when facing the high
probability
(
δLTU
)
:
EΠ
(
u∗∗, m∗∗|ψMB, δ
)
= EΠ
(
u∗∗, m∗∗|ψMB, δLTU
)
(5)
An important point to notice about expression (5) is that the optimal values (u∗∗, m∗∗) are
diﬀerent under each probability of detection. Given the above definitions, all firms with
productivity ψ ∈
(
ψL,ψMB
]
belong to the group of “bunching firms”.
Third, there is a group of high productivity firms, with ψ > ψMB, which are aﬀected
by the introduction of the LTU because they now face a higher probability of detection.
For these firms, reducing reporting revenue all the way to yLTU is too costly because it
involves either ineﬃciently low production or too much exposure to being detected by the
tax agency (or both). The optimality conditions faced by these firms are equivalent to (3)
and (4), but with δLTU (u,m) instead of δ (u,m). Hence, these “high productivity” firms re-
optimize and report higher revenue than they did in the benchmark case: y∗∗
(
ψ > ψMB
)
>
y∗
(
ψ > ψMB
)
> yLTU .
We can sum up the characterization of these three groups of firms as a function of
exogenous productivity levels:
• If ψi ∈
[
ψ,ψL
]
, firm i is a Low Productivity Firm
• If ψi ∈
(
ψL,ψMB
]
, firm i is a Bunching Firm
• If ψi ∈
(
ψMB,ψ
]
, firm i is a High Productivity Firm
Bunching firms are the most important group for our analysis. We use a first-order ap-
proximation to relate the number of bunching firms and the reported revenue response of
the marginal buncher. For analytical simplicity, consider the case where the LTU raises the
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detection probability by an arbitrarily small amount dδ ≡ δLTU (·)− δ (·). In this case, the
range of bunching firms would also be arbitrarily small and we can define dψ ≡ ψMB − ψL,
which is the diﬀerence in exogenous productivity between the marginal buncher and the
largest of the low productivity firms. In the benchmark case, we established that there is a
direct mapping from the pdf of the productivity parameter, h0 (ψ), to the pdf of reported
revenue, g0 (y). Hence, we can define the excess mass of bunching firms, B, as follows:
B =
ˆ yLTU+dy
yLTU
g0 (y) dy ≈ g0
(
yLTU
)
dyMB, (6)
where the approximation assumes that the counterfactual density g0 (y) is approximately
flat in the neighborhood of yLTU . The term g0
(
yLTU
)
denotes the height of the density
distribution at the LTU threshold (in the benchmark case), while dyMB is the change in
reported revenue for the marginal buncher in response to the introduction of the LTU.18
Under the strong assumption that firms face no optimization frictions19, dyMB can also be
interpreted as the length (in million Euros) of the interval were the density is zero, as shown
in Figure 2. To be able to estimate this amount, we use (6) to define the parameter b as the
ratio of excess bunching over the counterfactual density at the threshold:
b ≡
B
g0 (yLTU)
≈ dyMB (7)
In Section 4.1, we develop an empirical strategy to build a counterfactual distribution and
calculate the excess bunching mass in order to estimate b in the data. We refer to param-
eter b as a measure of “bunching intensity”. In Section 4.2, we relax the assumption of
no optimization frictions and define an alternative estimator of b that takes frictions into
account.
18In the benchmark scenario, the marginal buncher reported yMB0 = y
LY U + dy, but in presence of the
LTU this firm reports y¯∗∗ = yLTU .
19We discuss at length the implications of the existence of optimization frictions in Section 4.2.
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3 Institutional Background and Data
In the past three decades, multilateral institutions (IMF, 2002; OECD, 2011) have advised
national governments to set up large taxpayer units (LTU) in order to increase control over
the largest taxpayers and improve their tax compliance, based on the success of early adopters
of this policy. We summarize below the main characteristics of the Spanish LTU, the main
source of variation we exploit in this paper. We also describe two other policy thresholds
that are relevant to our empirical analysis.
3.1 Tax Administration Thresholds
LTU threshold
The Spanish tax agency established a LTU (Unidades Regionales de Gestión de Grandes
Empresas) in 1995, with an oﬃce in each of the 17 Spanish regions. The threshold to define
a “large firm” was set at €6 million in annual operating revenue and has not been modified
since then.20 Exporters that claim reimbursements on their VAT return are always included
in the LTU, regardless of their total reported revenue.21 When a firm reports revenue above
the threshold in a given year t, it is automatically added to a ’census’ of large firms in year
t + 1. Notice that the first annual tax return that the LTU can audit is that of year t, due
to the timing of tax reporting. Generally, the law allows tax auditors to revise tax returns
up to four years in the past.
Firms in the LTU census are subject to stricter monitoring and higher compliance re-
quirements. The LTU performs comprehensive tax audits on approximately 10% of large
firms each year, while barely 1% of firms below the threshold are audited (AEAT, Several
years). Moreover, firms in the LTU are required to file their VAT declarations on a monthly
basis (instead of quarterly) and in electronic form (as opposed to on paper). The latter
makes it easier to cross-check individual transactions of LTU firms compared to firms below
the threshold.22 Finally, the withholding rate on the corporate income tax is 25%, compared
to 18% for small firms, which could potentially create liquidity constraints for LTU firms.
20The threshold was originally set at 1 billion pesetas, the oﬃcial currency at the time. The fixed exchange
rate is 166.386 pesetas per euro, so the threshold is exactly at €6.010121 million. In 2006, an additional
threshold of €100 million in operating revenue was established to determine eligibility to the Central Delega-
tion for Large Firms, a select group of the largest firms within the LTU. We observe no evidence of bunching
at this revenue threshold.
21VAT evasion through so-called “carousel fraud” is a first-order issue at the European Union level (see
Keen and Smith (2007) for details).
22A recent reform extended electronic reporting to all firms since July 1st, 2008.
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The number of firms in the LTU census increased from 18,860 (2.4% of all registered
firms) in 1999 to 40,571 (2.9%) in 2007, due to economic growth and an annual inflation
rate around 3%. In the same period, the overall staﬀ of the tax agency remained almost
constant, but enforcement intensity is likely to have been stable or even increased thanks to
technological improvements. Firms in the LTU report about 80% of all taxable profits each
year and employ more than 40% of private sector employees (AEAT, Several years).
Corporate Income Tax Threshold
The standard rate in the corporate income tax throughout the period 1999-2007 was 35%
of profits. A lower tax rate of 30% was applied to firms under a revenue threshold that was
modified over time: from €1.5 million in 1999 up to €10 million in 2010 (full details provided
in Table 1). The eligibility cutoﬀ for this tax break overlapped with the LTU threshold in
2004, but was diﬀerent in every other year. The lower rate is applied only to the first €90,121
of profits (€120,202 since 2005) for eligible firms. Hence, there is notch for eligible firms
with low profits, and a kink for those with high profits.
External Audit Threshold
Firms are required by law to have their annual accounts audited by an external private firm
if they fulfill two of the following criteria for two consecutive years: (i) annual revenue above
€4.75 million; (ii) total assets above €2.4 million;23 and (iii) more than 50 employees on
average during the year. These criteria also determine whether a firm can use the abbreviated
form of the corporate income tax return, rather than the standard (long) version.
The external audit requirement complements tax enforcement policy because oﬃcial tax
audits typically use the private auditor’s report as a source of information. Moreover, private
auditors have an incentive to ensure truthful reporting because they face legal responsibility
if any misreporting is found.24 There is also a purely monetary cost associated with external
audits: the fee charged by private audit firms is in the range €10,000 - €30,000 for firms
with revenue close to €4.75 million, a small but non-negligible expenditure (0.2 to 0.6% of
total revenue, but 4 to 12% of reported profits on average).
23The revenue limit was originally 790 million Pesetas (€4.748 million), and the assets limit was 395
million Pesetas (€2.374 million). These criteria were modified starting in 2008, raising the revenue threshold
to €5.7 million and the assets threshold to €2.85 million.
24In private conversations, some auditors admit that they tolerate “small” amounts of misreporting, equiv-
alent to about 2-3% of the firm’s total operating revenue.
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3.2 Data
All firms in Spain are required by law to submit a summarized version of their annual accounts
to the Commercial Registry (Registro Mercantil Central). We use Amadeus, a European-
level dataset that compiles all these financial statements, for the period 1999-2011.25 The
information available for each firm includes: name, location (5-digit postal code), sector of
activity at the 4-digit level, 26 balance sheet items, 26 profit and loss account items, and 32
standard financial ratios.
The variable we use to determine whether firms are eligible to the LTU and other policies
is sales, defined as the annual net revenue from sales. We also look at production inputs:
materials includes the monetary cost of all raw materials and services purchased by the firm
in the production process, and costs of employees measures the total wage bill of a firm,
including social security contributions. The number of employees is reported at the end of
the fiscal year (which coincides with the calendar year). This variable is missing for about
20% of the firms that report their total sales and material inputs.
The main advantage of this dataset is its longitudinal structure, which allows us to study
the behavior of firms over time. Another important aspect is that we can analyze firm
behavior both as taxpayers and as tax intermediaries along several dimensions, e.g. diﬀerent
tax bases, from a single data source. This is sometimes not possible with administrative
tax returns, because these are usually anonymized and hence firms cannot be linked across
diﬀerent data sources. One limitation of the dataset is that many small firms do not submit
their accounts to the Commercial Registry, because it is costly to them and the associated
fines are small. Since the focus of this study is on firms with reported revenue around €6
million, we worry mostly about this group. Table 6 shows that more than 80% of firms with
reported revenue between €3 and €9 million are included in Amadeus, which is reasonably
close to the universe of all firms in this size range.
4 Empirical Strategy: Static Analysis
4.1 Operating Revenue Distribution
We begin by analyzing the distribution of firms’ reported operating revenues. In the absence
of any size-dependent regulation, our theoretical framework predicts a smoothly decreasing
25For the purposes of this paper, we accessed the online version of Amadeus in November 2011 for data
on years 1999-2007 and April 2013 for the years 2008-2011. Since the dataset is continuously updated, the
information currently available in the online version may have suﬀered some changes.
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and convex density distribution. This is consistent with standard models of firm size de-
termination (e.g., Lucas, 1978), and empirical regularities from comparable countries (e.g.,
Cabral and Mata, 2003). Any distortion in the reported revenue distribution at the thresh-
olds described above indicates that there is a behavioral response to tax administration
policies.
Using data from Amadeus, Figure 2 shows the distribution of reported revenues for
Spanish firms in the range between €3 and €9 million for the period 1999-2007. We pool
several annual cross-sections to increase the sample size and obtain smoother histograms,
taking advantage of the fact that tax administration thresholds remained constant in nominal
terms during this period. We observe two spikes in this distribution: a large one below
the LTU threshold, and a much smaller one below the External Audit threshold. These
behavioral responses indicate that firms are willing to incur a cost to report lower revenue
in order to avoid entering the LTU census. The spike at the External Audit threshold is
harder to interpret because the criteria to determine eligibility for the external audit involve
other variables apart from reported revenue. For this reason, in the remainder of this paper
we focus almost exclusively on the response to the LTU threshold.
There are two plausible concerns about the interpretation of the graphical evidence ob-
tained by pooling multiple annual cross-sections. First, there may be heterogeneity in the
bunching response across years that gets hidden in the aggregate picture. We show in
the Appendix and Table 13 that the distribution of reported revenue is stable for each
year throughout the period 1999-2007. A second concern is that there could be other size-
dependent policies that simultaneously aﬀect firm behavior. Apart from the small response
to the External Audit threshold discussed above, we are only aware of another such policy
during this period: the corporate income tax break for small firms described above. The
annual revenue distributions plotted in Figure 12 show no discernible bunching at the tax
break threshold in any year other than 2004, which is the only year when the two thresholds
coincide. The lack of reaction to a 5 percentage-point reduction in the corporate income tax
rate is striking in a context where firms are responding strongly to a discontinuity in tax
enforcement intensity. This indicates that the existence of the LTU generates substantial
incentives for firms to re-optimize.
4.2 Quantifying the Bunching Response
In order to quantify the size of the reported revenue response to the LTU cutoﬀ, we use
techniques from the bunching literature cited in the introduction. The key idea is to construct
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a counterfactual revenue distribution to estimate the excess bunching mass near the tax
enforcement threshold. To do this, we fit a high-degree polynomial to the observed density,
excluding an interval around the threshold where manipulation is most likely to occur. We
call this interval the “excluded region” and we explain below how we determine its upper and
lower bounds. As a first step, we divide the data in small bins of width w26 and estimate
the following polynomial regression:
Fj =
q∑
i=0
βi · (yj)
i +
yub∑
k=ylb
γk · (yj = k) + ηj (8)
where Fj is the number of firms in bin j, q is the order of the polynomial, yj is the revenue
midpoint of bin j, the interval [ylb, yub] corresponds to the excluded region, and the γk’s are
intercept shifters for each of the bins in the excluded region.27
We estimate the counterfactual distribution by calculating predicted values with the esti-
mated coeﬃcients from regression (8), excluding the γk shifters to eliminate the perturbations
around the threshold. Hence, the counterfactual density is given by:
F̂j =
q∑
i=0
β̂i · (yj)
i (9)
Comparing this counterfactual density to the observed distribution allows us to estimate the
excess bunching mass to the left of the threshold (B), and similarly the missing mass to the
right of the threshold (H):28
B̂ =
yLTU∑
j=ylb
∣∣∣Fj − F̂j∣∣∣ Ĥ = yub∑
j=yLTU
∣∣∣Fj − F̂j∣∣∣ (10)
Determining the lower and upper bounds of the excluded region in a consistent way is
critical for this estimation method to provide credible estimates. We follow the approach
26We use a bin width of €42,070, which allows us to precisely match the bin limits to each of the tax
administration thresholds.
27In this particular application, we add to equation (8) dummy variables for the bins in the interval
€4.5-€4.8 million, just below the External Audit threshold. This prevents the small spike in the density in
that range from aﬀecting the estimation of the counterfactual density around the LTU threshold. Adding
these terms improves the accuracy of the counterfactual estimation around the LTU threshold as long as the
bunching at the External Audit threshold is strictly local (i.e., firms bunching at the External Audit threshold
would have had reported revenues just a little above it), which we believe is a reasonable assumption.
28We use absolute values to ensure that both estimates yield positive numbers. Otherwise, Ĥ would be a
negative number. Recall that yLTU = €6 million in our setting.
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of Kleven and Waseem (2013), which is based on the principle that the area under the
counterfactual density has to equal the area under the observed density. We start by setting
an arbitrary lower bound, ylb, and then run equation (8) multiple times. The idea is to
eyeball the point where the distribution becomes distorted due to the bunching response,
since revenue manipulation is usually imprecise and not all bunching firms manage to locate
exactly at the threshold. Regarding the upper bound, in the first iteration we set yub ≈ yLTU ,
which tends to yield large estimates of B̂ and small estimates of Ĥ . The estimation routine
is programmed to increase the value of yub by a length w and run equation (8) again as long
as B̂ > Ĥ . The process continues until it reaches a value of yub such that B̂ = Ĥ .29
The results obtained allow us to estimate the bunching parameter b defined in equation
(7), which equals the ratio of excess bunching mass over the average height of the counter-
factual density in the interval
(
ylb, yLTU
]
. The actual estimator formula is given by:
b̂NF =
B̂[
1
1+(yLTU−ylb)/w
]∑yLTU
j=ylb
β̂i · (yj)
i
, (11)
where the term
[
1 +
(
yLTU − ylb
)
/w
]
is the number of excluded bins below the threshold. We
use the subscript NF to indicate that it is defined under the assumption of no optimization
frictions. This assumption implies that every firm has the ability to modify its reported
revenue as it wants (through real or evasion responses) in order to bunch below the threshold.
The assumption is very restrictive in this setting, since we can see in Figure 2 that many
firms report revenues just above the LTU threshold. We discuss a correction to this estimator
that takes optimization frictions into account in the next subsection.
Since this estimation procedure is applied to the universe of Spanish firms rather than
a random sample, there is no sampling error and therefore we cannot construct the usual
confidence intervals. To test whether the point estimates are statistically significant, we
sample the residuals from regression (8) a large number of times (with replacement) to
obtain bootstrapped standard errors.30
We obtain a point estimate of b̂NF = 0.086 (s.e. 0.005) for the period 1999-2007 and
b̂NF = 0.026 (s.e. 0.004) for the period 2008-2011. Both are precisely estimated and statis-
29Recall that w is the width of the bins used to build the counterfactual. The fact that there is a finite
number of bins means that, in practice, we need to impose the weaker condition that the ratio is “close” to
one:
(
Hˆ/Bˆ
)
> 0.95.
30We thank Michael Best for sharing his Stata code to perform this bootstrapping routine. In all the
results shown below, we perform 200 iterations to obtain the standard errors. Using a larger number does
not aﬀect our results.
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tically diﬀerent from zero at the 1% level. To interpret the estimator b̂NF , we make two key
assumptions. First, we assume that firms face no optimization frictions, as explained above.
Second, we assume that the smoothly decreasing counterfactual density defined by (9) is a
good approximation of the theoretical revenue distribution in the absence of the LTU thresh-
old. Under these assumptions, the results for 1999-2007 mean that the marginal buncher
reports revenue €86,000 lower, or 1.4% of their total revenue, than it would have if the LTU
threshold did not exist (€26,000, equivalent to 0.4% of total revenue, for 2008-2011).
Most papers in the bunching literature (e.g., Saez, 2010; Chetty et al., 2011) use b as the
numerator of the elasticity of taxable income, the structural parameter of interest in their
settings. The denominator in that elasticity is the proportional change in the net-of-tax
rate.31 In our setting, the policy that changes at the threshold is the probability of detection
δ, which is very diﬃcult to measure because enforcement strategies include many elements
(audit probabilities, ability to cross-check transactions, etc.) that are themselves hard to
quantify. Therefore, we do not attempt to estimate the elasticity of reported income with
respect to tax enforcement, which would be the structural parameter of interest. This does
not mean that our results cannot be generalized to other contexts. Dozens of countries around
the world have established LTUs within their tax agencies and, although the designs vary
widely, many of them also use revenue thresholds to determine eligibility OECD (2011). Our
results are therefore indicative of the potential eﬀects of setting LTU eligibility thresholds
based only on reported revenue.
To address the concern that the arbitrary selection of ylb could bias the estimation, we
perform a sensitivity analysis. We pick diﬀerent values for the lower bound of the excluded
region around our preferred value of €5.5 million, such that ylb = {5.3, ..., 5.7}. Table 3
reports the results for the pooled 1999-2007 data. The upper bound yub is quite stable be-
tween €6.5 and €6.6 million. Similarly, point estimates for b̂NF are always between 0.081
and 0.086. One of the reasons why these estimates are so robust is that the revenue distri-
bution for the period 1999-2007 is very smooth except in the interval around the threshold,
where bunching is substantial. When applying the same method to distributions with less
bunching or more noise, the estimates tend to be more sensitive to the choice of ylb. The
same is true of regression analysis when the variance of the dependent variable is very high
compared to that of the explanatory variables and the researcher specifies diﬀerent functional
forms.
31The net-of-tax rate is defined as 1− t, where t is the tax rate.
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4.2.1 Optimization Frictions
Contrary to prediction of the stylized model without frictions, we do not observe a hole in
the distribution just above the LTU threshold – just a small dip. This suggests that some
firms are not able to adjust their reported revenue as easily as others, and end up reporting
revenues just above the cutoﬀ. Thus, the monetary interpretation of estimates of bNF may
not a precise measure of firms’ structural response to a change in tax enforcement, because
it ignores the influence of optimization frictions on the behavior of some firms.
Optimization frictions have been a widely discussed issue in the bunching literature,
sometimes because the cost of not re-optimizing is low in many contexts. This is partic-
ularly relevant at kink points, where the marginal tax rate jumps discontinuously but the
average tax rate varies smoothly. For example, Chetty (2012) shows that an adjustment cost
equivalent to 1% of total expenditure makes a high intensive-margin elasticity compatible
with a zero bunching response. The incentives to bunch are considerably stronger in the
case of notches, because the associated cost of inaction grows at a first-order rate with the
size of the policy change (Slemrod, 2010; Chetty, 2012).
Even though businesses have more control over their reported income than wage earners
(whose income is third-party reported), there are several reasons why firms might not respond
to the existence of the LTU. First, about half of the firms locating just above the cutoﬀ in
any given year had previous exposure to the LTU. That is, their revenue had already been
above €6 million for at least one year before the moment in which we observe them. Second,
some firms may not be planning to misreport their activities regardless of the enforcement
regime. This could be due to preferences of the manager against tax evasion or perhaps
due to inability to evade given some sector characteristics (e.g., government contracts). For
these firms, the only consequence of being in the LTU is facing additional compliance costs.
Third, firms might be unable to control their revenue with precision due to adjustment costs
or unexpected shocks. Fourth, as mentioned in the previous section, exporters are always
included in the LTU regardless of their revenue, so they do not have incentives to manipulate
their revenues to avoid the additional tax enforcement.
We illustrate the importance of the first reason with some evidence for growing and
shrinking firms. Recall that firms are added to the LTU census the year after their revenues
rise above €6 million, and they are taken out one year after their revenues drop below the
cutoﬀ. Despite this formal symmetry, entering the LTU in practice forces some businesses
to make important administrative changes to adapt to the higher enforcement regime. For
example, they would have to give up having two sets of accounting books. Once the firm
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puts an end to the parallel accounting system, it is hard to set it up again after dropping out
of the LTU census. Moreover, in small regions there is only a few hundred large firms, which
are well known by the local LTU staﬀ. Anecdotally, oﬃcers from the tax agency report that
marginal firms in small regions often move their headquarters to a large city (e.g., Madrid,
the capital) to blend into a larger group of firms and lower their expected probability of
audit.
To test whether entering the LTU is seen by firms as a fixed cost, we compare the
behavior of firms whose reported revenue is growing to those that are shrinking. Specifically,
a growing firm is defined as having higher revenues in year t than in t − 1 (vice versa for
shrinking). Figure 6 shows the striking diﬀerences in the revenue distributions for these
two groups for the full period 1999-2011. Growing firms bunch very strongly at the LTU
threshold, but barely react to the External Audit threshold. In contrast, shrinking firms do
the exact opposite: they bunch in response to the External Audit requirement, but their
response to the LTU cutoﬀ is minimal.32 We conclude that some growing firms avoid the
LTU because they anticipate it will involve paying a one-time adjustment cost and it will
reduce their ability to evade taxes in future years. In contrast, shrinking firms with previous
LTU exposure have less to gain from bunching just below the threshold because they have
already incurred the fixed cost.
Rather than introducing each source of rigidity explicitly into the model, we assess their
combined impact to an upper bound of the structural response.33 We define α as the pro-
portion of firms locating in the interval
(
yLTU , yub
]
, compared to the counterfactual density.
This includes all firms that do not bunch even though there are firms similar to them (ac-
cording to our counterfactual) that do bunch. We use this measure to re-weight the estimates
of b̂NF , and use the subscript F to indicate that the new estimator accounts for optimization
frictions. Thus, b̂F can be thought of as treatment-on-the-treated estimator for firms with
low adjustment costs:
b̂F =
b̂NF
1− α
(12)
32In a more disaggregated analysis, we observe that the only subset of shrinking firms that features
bunching at the LTU threshold is composed of firms with revenue falling between 0% and -3%. However,
firms with a revenue decrease of -3% or beyond show no bunching response. There is always some bunching
at the External Audit threshold for these two groups.
33Kleven and Waseem (2013) propose a similar method to account for optimization frictions, although in
their case there is a strictly dominated region in which no taxpayer should locate under any preferences,
because their take-home pay falls as income rises. In our setting, there is no strictly dominated region
because there may be heterogeneity in the optimization frictions faced by firms.
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We interpret estimates of b̂F as an upper bound of the firms’ response to a change in tax
enforcement, since b̂F ≥ b̂NF by definition (notice that α ≥ 0). We calculate standard errors
for this estimator with the same bootstrapping procedure used above.
The estimate taking frictions into account is b̂F = 0.465 (s.e. 0.052) for the period 1990-
2007 and b̂F = 0.384 (s.e. 0.042) for 2008-2011. To provide a sense of the magnitude of this
response, consider that the average profit margin of firms around the LTU threshold is 4.4%
of revenue, approximately €290,000. If the entire response is due to revenue underreporting,
then the marginal buncher’s would wipe out its taxable profits completely and evade its
entire tax liability. However, caution is warranted because we do not know to what extent
the response is pure evasion or there is also a real response.
4.3 Heterogeneous Responses
We have shown that the annual revenue distributions are stable within the two broad periods
of economic boom (1999-2007) and recession (2008-2011). However, there could be a great
deal of heterogeneity across multiple dimensions such as: number of employees, fixed assets,
organizational form, sector of activity, and region where the headquarters are located. The
main results of these exercises are reported in Table 4 and Figures 17-5.
Heterogeneous Responses across other Dimensions of Firm Size. Conditional on
being the neighborhood of the LTU threshold, firms with more employees and/or assets tend
to have a more complex structure, so they need to have sophisticated accounting systems in
place that make misreporting more costly and risky. Holding everything else constant, we
expect to see the strongest bunching response among smaller firms along these dimensions.
Figures 17 and 18 plot the revenue distributions for groups of firms of diﬀerent sizes in
terms of employees and fixed assets. The density distribution is strongly right-skewed for
the smallest firms, while it is almost flat for the largest ones. Bunching at the LTU threshold
is strongest among firms below the 50-employee and €2.4-million-in-assets marks.34 The “no
frictions” bunching estimates are in the same order of magnitude for the very small (less
than 40 employees) and large firms (more than 50), with b̂NF ≈ 0.08. Similar results are
found for firms with less than €5 million in assets, but the bunching estimates are much
smaller and only marginally significant for firms with more assets.
34Notice that these are two of the three eligibility criteria in the External Audit threshold. There are
also a number of labor regulations that apply only to firms with more than 50 employees, for example the
obligation to have a Workers’ Council where unions are represented and acquire some decision power within
the company.
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Table 4 also reports bunching estimates for firms with diﬀerent legal forms, “Sociedad
Limitada (SL)” (comparable to Limited Liability Company in the US) and “Sociedad Anón-
ima (SA)” (comparable to a Corporation). The capital requirements to set up a SL are
smaller than for a SA, but the latter is the natural legal form for publicly traded companies.
SL’s are more numerous and smaller on average, but we do not find significantly diﬀerent
bunching responses, as can be seen in Figure 19. This can be explained by the fact that
both legal forms are treated equally in terms of taxation.
Regional Variation. Given that the LTU is organized in regional oﬃces, there might be
variation in the enforcement intensity change experienced when crossing the threshold in
each region. Figure 20 shows a map with the 17 Autonomous Regions in Spain. We use
a color scale to show the diﬀerent bunching intensity observed in the revenue distribution
in each region. Lighter (yellow) tones apply to low bunching regions, while darker tones
(red) denote high-bunching regions. The lowest bunching is observed in Navarra and País
Vasco, the two regions in the North-Center where the Large Taxpayers’ Unit (LTU) only
applies to firms those that operate extensively in the rest of Spain. There is relatively
(but statistically significant) low bunching in the Northern and Eastern regions of Cataluña,
Aragón, Valencia and Baleares. Meanwhile, bunching is relatively high in the South, Center
and North-West. The top bunchers are Extremadura, a relatively poor region in the Center-
West, and Cantabria, a middle-income small region in the North. One potential story is
that the prevalence of tax evasion is higher in the regions with larger bunching responses.
Alternatively, it could be that firms have stronger incentives to bunch in regions where the
LTU oﬃce is more competent. Since we do not have reliable measures of the quality of tax
enforcement in each regional LTU oﬃce, it is diﬃcult to provide an clear interpretation of
this regional heterogeneity.
Heterogeneity across Sectors of Activity. Firms in diﬀerent sectors of the economy
face diﬀerent constraints on misreporting, depending on their technology, e.g. whether they
are labor intensive or not. A restaurant with €6 million in revenue is typically a medium-
large company with dozens of employees, and most likely with more than one location. In
contrast, a merchant wholesaler that sells electronic products typically reaches that revenue
level about 15 employees. To explore how companies operating in such diﬀerent markets
respond to the same nominal revenue threshold, we define 12 diﬀerent sectors of economic
activity (details on how the sectors are defined can be found in the Appendix). The intuition
is that selling to final consumers makes underreporting much easier because the VAT self-
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enforcing mechanism breaks down at that stage. For the second element, the idea is that it
is easier to underreport if the number of employees is small.
Figure 5 shows a scatterplot of bunching responses by sector (measured by b̂NF , vertical
axis) and final consumption as a share of total sales (horizontal axis). The relationship
is downward slope, suggesting that the incentives to remain under the LTU threshold are
stronger for firms in sector where a low percentage of sales is made to final conumers. One
possible theory to explain this trend is that when retailers underreport, it is extremely hard
even for the LTU to detect it because it hard to trace small cash transactions. Moreover, the
median number of employees of retail firms around the revenue cutoﬀ is just 21. Between
these two extremes we observe mostly the industrial sectors: manufacturing, wholesale and
construction. Focusing only on these sectors, it seems that the relationship between scope of
evasion and bunching intensity could be positive, but the small number of data points limits
our ability to draw a strong conclusion.
5 Empirical Strategy: Dynamic Analysis
The analysis from the previous section imposes a static perspective by pooling observations
from diﬀerent years. This means that many firms appear in the data in multiple years,
but the graphical analysis does not control for potential autocorrelation. To improve our
interpretation of the bunching response, we are interested in understanding the dynamic
behavior of firms. In particular, we are concerned that persistence in behavior could bias
our bunching estimates. We present below some descriptives of firms’ growth patterns and
analyze the extent of bunching persistence.
Figure 7 shows the proportion of firms whose revenue grows between years t and t + 1,
plotted against reported revenue in year t. For the boom period 1999-2007 (top), about 61%
of firms on average increase their revenue the following period. This proportion is stable
in the range €2-€10 million with a slight upward trend, except for a short interval below
the LTU threshold where it drops significantly to about 55%. The drop is less pronounced
for the recession period (2008-2011), where the proportion of firms growing is substantially
lower at around 37% (bottom panel). These patterns broadly corroborate the intuition from
the static estimates: as small firms grow and approach the threshold, a subset of them slows
down their growth to avoid crossing it. Notice that it is enough with a small subset of firms
reverting their trend to generate a substantial amount of bunching.
Another interesting variable to look at is median revenue growth in the following year,
24
that is Σimedian (ln (yi,t+1)− ln (yi,t)). We consider median instead of average growth be-
cause the distribution of growth rates has very long tails of extreme values and hence bin
averages are erratic.35 The top panel of Figure 7 shows median revenue growth by current
revenue bins for the boom period. Growth rates are similar for firms with current revenue
between €2-€5 and €6-€10 million. However, there is a sharp decline in median growth
rates as firms approach the threshold from below, i.e., between €5-€6 million. This is an-
other indication that a group of firms artificially reduces its growth as they approach the
threshold. The pattern is smoother in the recession period (bottom panel), with much lower
median growth rates, as shown in the bottom panel of Figure 7.
Finally, we consider persistent bunching behavior, which could bias our static estimates
if our bunching estimator is only capturing the behavior of a few firms that remain just
below the threshold for many years. It is important to keep in mind that the LTU notch was
fixed in nominal terms throughout the 1999-2011 period, but inflation averaged 3% per year.
Thus, the notch moved down about 27% between 1999 and 2007, and 43% if we consider
the full period up to 2011.36 To obtain a measure of bunching persistence, we follow the
approach proposed by Marx (2012). The idea is to estimate whether firms are more likely
to stay in the bunching region than in any other part of the revenue distribution. In order
to precisely define the bunching region, we divide reported revenues in equally sized bins
of €250,000, such that the bunching bin includes reported revenues between €5.75 and €6
million.37 We then compare the fraction of firms that remain in the bunching bin after h
years to the fraction that remain in other revenue bins, where h = {1, 2, ..., 10}. In the data,
the probability of staying in a given revenue bin decreases with revenue for all values of h,
because the equal-sized bins are proportionally smaller as we move to higher revenue levels.
We estimate the following regression model:
Prob [bin (yit) = bin (yi,t+h)] = α + βBunchBinit + yit + y
2
it + λt + εit (13)
where yit is reported revenue by firm i in year t, the left-hand side variable is the fraction of
firms that report revenues in the same bin in years t and t+ h, BunchBinit takes value one
if yit ∈ (5.75, 6], and λt denotes a vector of year dummies. We add a quadratic polynomial
in current reported revenue as a way to control for the counterfactual probability that firms
35In particular, there is a considerable number of firms whose revenues drop from a few million euros to
basically zero the following year. The large negative growth rates registered by these firms bias average
growth rates down, resulting in negative numbers even during the boom years.
36We obtain these numbers simply calculating (1.03)8 = 1.27 and (1.03)12 = 1.43.
37The results are qualitatively similar for other bin widths, such as €100,000 or €500,000.
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remain in a given revenue bin. Instead of using revenue levels, we use the distance to the
notch so that the constant term α can be interpreted as the fraction of firms near the notch
expected to remain at their current revenue level h years from now.
Figure 8 shows the results graphically. The top-left diagram shows the probability
that firms remain in the same revenue bin after one year. This probability decreases
smoothly from about 24% in the range yit ∈ (€2,€2.25 million) to 6% in the range yit ∈
(€9.75,€10 million). However, there is a clear deviation from the trend at the bunching
bin, where the proportion of firms that stay is 14.8%, compared to the 8.4% predicted by
the counterfactual. This means that a firm in the bunching bin is 75 percent (6.3 percentage
points) more likely to remain in the same revenue bin one year later. The regression results
for all values of h are summarized in Table 5. The coeﬃcient on the BunchBin dummy is
significant at the 5% level for all lags up to six years, although the economic significance is
much stronger for the short lags (up to three years).
6 Empirical Analysis: Reported Input Costs
In the appendix, we derive several extensions to the model from Section 4 to allow firms to
choose their input use and also to misreport their input costs. Here, we summarize briefly
the theoretical predictions for the model with two inputs (materials and labor) and two taxes
(corporate income tax and VAT) and present some empirical evidence. When bunching is
due to a real production response, this model predicts an upward jump in reported input
costs at the threshold (that is, firms just below the threshold report less labor and material
inputs than firms just above). This follows from the fact that bunching firms have higher
productivity and the production function is concave, so bunching firms need fewer inputs to
produce the same output as other firms. When bunching is due to tax evasion, the model
predicts a downward jump in reported material inputs at the LTU threshold. This is due
to bunching firms producing more output (and hence using more inputs) than they report.
Since we expect bunching firms to also overreport their material inputs, the jump will be
even more pronounced. In contrast, the model predicts a downward jump in reported labor
costs, for exactly the opposite reasons.
These predictions can be tested with simple graphical evidence showing how the reported
input ratios behave around the LTU threshold. We use these graphs to rule out some of the
stories consistent with the models, rather than to identify causal eﬀects. Recall that firms
are included in the LTU census the year after they cross the threshold. Therefore, we could
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interpret that the degree of tax enforcement (low or high) in a given year depends on reported
revenue the previous year. This interpretation implicitly assumes that firms do not know
whether they will finish the year above or below €6 million in reported revenue. However, it
can also be argued that firms are likely to anticipate what type of enforcement they will face
the following year, and hence they will adjust their reporting behavior accordingly. Since
there are good arguments in favor of both interpretations, we show all our results considering
the outcome variables (reported input costs) in year t+ 1 and also in year t, always against
revenues in year t.
6.1 Graphical Evidence
The left panels of Figure ?? plot the ratio of reported input costs over reported revenue on
the vertical axis and reported revenue in the horizontal axis, both measured in year t. The
right panels plot the same variables, but in this case the ratio of inputs over revenue measured
in period t + 1. The solid lines show a quadratic fit of bin averages with 95% confidence
intervals, while the dots indicate median values for each bin. All bins are €200,000 wide.
The top panels include data from the boom period (1999-2007) and the bottom panels for
the recession period (2008-2011). There is no adjustment for inflation in any of the graphs
because the outcome variable is a ratio of two nominal amounts.38 The ratio of inputs
over revenue is remarkably stable for diﬀerent levels of revenue at approximately 94% for
all variable definitions and periods. Both medians and averages show a small downward
jump at the LTU threshold, but the diﬀerence is statistically insignificant so the evidence is
inconclusive with respect to the models’ predictions.
The same four plots are shown in Figure 9 using the ratio of material input costs over
revenue as the outcome variable. The ratio slopes up in a concave shape, indicating that
firms with higher revenues use an increasingly higher proportion of material inputs. In
the boom period, the material over revenue ratio jumps sharply downwards by about 1
percentage point (the median value for the ratio is around 70% in the boom period and 66%
in the recession period). This is true both for bin averages and medians, and the distance
is statistically significant. The pattern is similar for the recession period, but the jump is
smaller and not significant. These patterns are compatible with an evasion response where
firms either underreport their revenue or overreport their materials. In contrast, they are
incompatible with a fully real response, because in that case we should observe an upward
jump at the threshold.
38We assume implicitly that the inflation on the output good is the same as for inputs.
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Figure 10 shows the same evidence for the ratio of labor inputs over revenue. The patterns
observed are approximately the inverse of those for materials: there is an upward jump in the
ratio of labor costs over revenue at the threshold, which is more pronounced during the boom
period than the recession period. The size of the jump is approximately 1 percentage point,
but in this case it is more relevant because median labor costs are about 12% of revenue.
The upward jump is compatible both with a real response (highly productive bunching firms
need less labor to produce the same output) and with an evasion response in which labor
costs are underreported.
There are two broad interpretations for these patterns of materials and labor input costs
around the LTU threshold. First, it could be that bunching firms respond to the diﬀerential
tax incentives by overreporting material inputs and underreporting labor expenses. We call
this the “input-misreporting hypothesis”. It is consistent with the theory for the two jumps
to cancel each other out and thus not lead to any discontinuity in total reported inputs. A
second interpretation is that labor-intensive firms are less likely to bunch below the LTU
threshold, which mechanically yields lower average labor inputs in the bunching interval. We
call this the “composition-eﬀect hypothesis”. Under this hypothesis, the discontinuities at the
threshold would be explained by diﬀerential sorting across sectors. The two interpretations
are observationally equivalent, so we need additional tests to determine which hypothesis is
more plausible.
Figures 11 and 11 provide a more disaggregated picture of labor input costs. Figure 11
plots our measure of average wages, which features an upward jump at the threshold. The
jump is more pronounced and statistically significant for the boom period, as was the case
for labor inputs. It is harder to visualize a discontinuity in the average or median number of
employees at the threshold, as can be seen in Figure 11. The fact that the drop in labor costs
is mostly due to lower average wages (rather than fewer employees) seems easier to square
with the evasion hypothesis. To associate this with the composition-eﬀect hypothesis, one
would have to explain why less labor-intensive firms also pay lower wages on average. In any
case, the evidence presented in this subsection is only suggestive and is not enough to assert
with full certainty that the evasion hypothesis is correct.
7 Eﬃciency Costs of Tax Enforcement
The empirical results obtained in the previous sections suggest that firms respond to the tax
enforcement threshold mostly by underreporting their operating revenue, without reducing
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actual production in a significant way. Drawing from the literature on the deadweight loss
of taxation in the presence of evasion and avoidance, we provide an upper bound for the
eﬃciency costs of tax enforcement. In the final subsection, we perform a rough calculation
of the losses in tax revenue due to evasion in the low enforcement regime.
As noted above, the introduction of a proportional tax on profits did not generate an
ineﬃciency in this framework, but the distortions created by tax enforcement elicit behavioral
responses from firms that could lead to eﬃciency costs. To set up a social welfare function,
we make the simplifying assumption that each firm is owned by one individual, whose total
income is the after-tax profit of the firm. That way, we can aggregate these individuals’
welfare to the tax revenue raised by the government and make meaningful comparisons. In
this theoretical framework, an increase in tax enforcement (summarized by the probability of
detection, δ) is equivalent to an increase in the expected tax rate. Therefore, we can evaluate
how expected welfare changes in response to an increase in tax enforcement in the same way
that the literature on the deadweight loss of taxation evaluates the welfare implications of
tax changes.
We define expected welfare as the sum of expected profits and expected tax revenue:
EW (δ) = {(1− t)Π + tu [1− δ (1 + θ)]} + t [Π− u [1− δ (1 + θ)]] (14)
By envelope theorem, we can ignore behavioral responses in the term in curly brackets,
because firms are already choosingm and u to maximize expected profits. Hence, an increase
in tax enforcement leads to the following change in expected welfare:
d
dδ
EW = t
[
−u (1 + θ) +
dΠ
dδ
−
du
dδ
[1− δ (1 + θ)] + u (1 + θ)
]
= t
dΠ
dδ
− t
[
du
dδ
[1− δ (1 + θ)]
]
(15)
= t
dΠ
dδ
+ t
du
dδ
[δ (1 + θ)] (16)
We know from comparative statics that dudδ |u=u∗ < 0, so the second term in (16) is negative.
This implies that the change in expected welfare due to an increase in enforcement is neither
proportional to the elasticity of reported taxable profits
(
Π
)
nor to the elasticity of true
profits (Π), but to an intermediate amount. Formally,
t
dΠ
dδ
≤
d
dδ
EW ≤ t
dΠ
dδ
. (17)
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Hence, the eﬃciency cost of tax enforcement cannot be calculated based solely on the
eﬀects on reported profits. The response of true profits has to be taken into account as well.
We return to this discussion in Section 6, after presenting our empirical results.
A crucial question for the design of tax administration policies is whether there are
large eﬃciency costs from tax enforcement. The previous subsection laid the ground for
this estimation by deriving expressions for the change in expected welfare associated to an
increase in tax enforcement. In our theoretical framework, an increase in tax enforcement is
equivalent to an increase in the expected tax rate.
In two influential papers, Feldstein (1995, 1999) argued that the elasticity of taxable
income with respect to tax rate changes is a suﬃcient statistic to estimate the excess burden
of taxation. This result is useful because it accounts for all the key behavioral responses
to taxation (labor supply, avoidance, and evasion), and also because taxable income data is
widely available. The key assumption driving Feldstein’s result is that tax evaders equate
the marginal private cost of evasion (or avoidance) to the marginal cost of reducing true
income (by producing less), so that the specific reason why they report lower income does
not matter for eﬃciency.
Chetty (2009) points out that Feldstein’s result implicitly assumes that the marginal
social cost of evasion and avoidance diﬀers from the tax rate (the marginal benefit). Chetty
considers two types of sheltering costs (where sheltering includes both evasion and avoid-
ance). First, there are “resource costs” that make production less eﬃcient when there is
evasion. For example, the need to have accountants keeping two diﬀerent books, or the lost
profits for operating in cash. If evaders only incur a resource cost, then Feldstein’s result
holds. A conceptually diﬀerent cost is what Chetty calls “transfer costs”, for example a
monetary penalty to punish evasion behavior. A penalty has a private cost to the evader,
but no social cost because the resources are transferred to the government another agent
(assuming risk neutrality, as is standard when modeling firm behavior). Chetty shows that
the excess burden of taxation in the presence of such transfer costs is directly proportional
to the elasticity of total earned income (as opposed to taxable income).
The theoretical framework presented in Section 2 is slightly more complicated than
Chetty’s because the probability of detection depends on firm size, besides the amount
evaded. In spite of this diﬀerence, equations (15) and (16) deliver a qualitatively similar
result: when firms face only transfer costs of evading, the deadweight loss generated by an
increase in tax enforcement is less than proportional to the eﬀect on reported profits. The
lack of a real production response to the existence of the LTU implies that the eﬃciency
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cost of increasing tax enforcement is not high in this context. The eﬀect of this enforce-
ment policy is to redistribute resources from tax-compliant firms (or other taxpayers) to tax
evaders.
One aspect that we have not addressed so far is the administrative cost of higher en-
forcement. This could be easily introduced in the model with the function q (δ), which is
increasing in δ. The modified equations (15) and (16) would be:
d
dδ
EW = t
dΠ
dδ
− t
[
du
dδ
[1− δ (1 + θ)]
]
−
dq
dδ
(18)
= t
dΠ
dδ
+ t
du
dδ
[δ (1 + θ)]−
dq
dδ
(19)
It is challenging to obtain measures of the marginal increase in administrative costs associated
to an increase in tax enforcement. We only have access to the total cost of the tax agency in
Spain, which was €1.33 billion in the year 2007, when it raised €250 billion in tax revenue
(€188 collected per €1 spent or, equivalently, 0.5 cents of a euro per each euro collected).39
The marginal return to spending an additional euro on enforcement is likely to be below this
average return, but also well above an additional euro in tax revenue. To guide a cost-benefit
calculation to determine what is the socially optimal enforcement intensity, we would need
to consider the tax revenue lost due to low enforcement.
8 Concluding Remarks
This paper examines the behavioral responses of firms to increases in tax enforcement. The
empirical analysis relies on a theoretical framework that considers firms’ incentives to evade
taxes. The predictions of this model are tested using the discontinuity in tax enforcement
intensity created by a Large Taxpayers Unit in Spain.
The empirical results show a strong reaction of firms to avoid larger tax enforcement that
creates a significant distortion in the firm size distribution in Spain. This persistent pattern
over time is created by groups of firms that as they approach to the threshold reduce their
reported revenue increasing hidden activity. The documented heterogeneous reaction among
firms illustrates the relevance of several features, such as the position of the firm in the
productive firm or the number of employees, to determine firms’ ability to evade taxes. The
39The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) of the United States, considered one of the most eﬃcient tax agencies
in the world, collected $2.4 trillion in 2007, with an administrative cost of $10.7 billion. Hence, the IRS
collects $224 per $1 spent, higher than the Spanish tax agency, but in the same order of magnitude. (Source:
www.irs.gov).
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patterns of the data also point that firms staying in the low enforcement regime have larger
scope to evade taxes by overreporting their material input costs and also colluding with
their employees to pay part of their wages “in black” (potentially using the underreported
revenue).
The results of this paper reveal that third-party reporting by firms and the presence of
paper trail in the VAT are not enough to guarantee complete tax enforcement. Tax agencies
must devote resources to closely monitor firms undertaking cross-checking and audits that
benefit from transactions information provided by taxpayers. Overall, the conclusions of the
paper imply that theoretical and empirical research on tax evasion must put more emphasis
on examining the behavior firms, the critical fiscal agent in advanced economies.
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Tables
Table 1: Revenue Threshold: Corporate Income Tax Benefit for Small Firms
Year Threshold Standard tax rate Special tax rate Applicable range
1999
€1.5 million
35% 30%
2000 Up to
2001 €3 million €90,151
2002
€5 million
of taxable
2003 profits
2004 €6 million
2005
€8 million
Up to
2006 €120,202
2007 32.5% of taxable
2008
30% 25%
profits
2009
2010
€10 million
Up to
2011 €300,000
2012 of tax. profits
Source: the applicable laws are: Law 43/1995 (Article 122), Law 6/2000 (Article 122), Law 24/2001
(Article 122), Law 4/2004 (Article 108), Law 2/2004 of the Presupuestos Generales del Estado
(Annual Government Budget Law, Article 108), and Real Decreto Ley 13/2010 (Royal Law Decree,
Article 108).
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Table 2: Bunching Estimations
bNF bF B H ylb yub N
Pooled data
1999-2007 .082*** .428*** 3394.3 3447.9 5.50 6.54 290,711
(.005) (.048)
Annual data
1999 .1438*** .721*** 385.8 378.0 5.50 6.94 20,397
(.014) (.180)
2000 .116*** .549*** 382.6 367.2 5.50 6.70 23,525
(.013) (.120)
2001 .082*** .534*** 305.9 298.5 5.50 6.70 26,466
(.013) (.214)
2002 .054*** .252*** 224.5 217.3 5.50 6.30 29,086
(.008) (.053)
2003 .070*** .323*** 314.5 301.1 5.50 6.38 31,629
(.009) (.067)
2004 .088*** .422*** 429.5 408.6 5.50 6.50 34,540
(.009) (.077)
2005 .074*** .364*** 403.1 415.4 5.50 6.46 38,182
(.008) (.062)
2006 .084*** .406*** 530.7 536.3 5.50 6.50 43,538
(.008) (.065)
2007 .069*** .345*** 435.2 434.7 5.50 6.42 43,348
(.009) (.073)
Note: bNF and bF are the bunching intensity parameters assuming no frictions and frictions, re-
spectively. B is the number of firms above the counterfactual density of revenue in the range
y ∈
(
ylb, yLTU
)
, where y is revenue, ylb is the lower bound of the excluded region (used to construct
the counterfactual) and yLTU is the LTU threshold of €6 million. H is the missing number of firms
below the counterfactual density in the range y ∈
(
yLTU , yub
)
, where yub is the upper bound of
the excluded region. Finally, N is the number of observations included in the estimations, i.e. the
number of firms with revenue y ∈ (€3,€9) million in each year. Significance levels: *** = 1%, **
= 5%, and * = 10%.
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Table 3: Sensitivity Analysis for the Bunching Estimators
Excluded region Point estimates
Lower bound: ylb Upper bound: yub No frictions: bNF Frictions: bF
5.30 6.46 0.075*** 0.368***
5.40 6.50 0.079*** 0.403***
5.50 6.54 0.082*** 0.428***
5.60 6.50 0.082*** 0.420***
5.70 6.46 0.081*** 0.394***
Note: This table shows the sensitivity of the bunching estimators to diﬀerent assumptions on the
excluded region used to estimate the counterfactual. We arbitrarily fix diﬀerent values of ylb in the
first column and then obtain the corresponding value of yub and the point estimates for the bunching
estimators b̂NF and b̂F . These estimations use data only for the period 1999-2007. Significance
levels: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, and * = 10%.
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Table 4: Heterogeneity of the Response Across Groups
No Frictions: bNF Frictions: bF
By Number of Employees
1− 25 employees .078*** .309***
(.006) (.040)
26− 40 employees .084*** .462***
(.006) (.069)
41− 50 employees .128*** 1.167
(.013) (.808)
More than 50 employees .078*** .745***
(004) (.116)
By Fixed Assets
0− 0.6 million Euros .089*** .352***
(.006) (.042)
0.6− 2.4 million Euros .097*** .638***
(.005) (.084)
2.4− 5 million Euros .084*** .528***
(.006) (.075)
More than 5 million Euros .019*** .209***
(.006) (.098)
By Organizational Form
SA (Corporation) .084*** .585***
(.004) (.066)
SL (L.L.C.) .088*** .381***
(.005) (.039)
By Revenue Trend
Growing .106*** .524***(
yt > yt−1
)
(.004) (.040)
Shrinking .015 .940(
yt < yt−1
)
(.014) (1.674)
Note: this table reports the bunching intensity estimates for “no frictions” and “frictions” (̂bNF and
b̂F ) for diﬀerent subsamples of firms. The subsample are defined by number of employees, by the
level of fixed assets, by the type of organizational form, and by the firms’ growing trends. In the
latter case, yt stands for reported revenue in year t. These estimates are obtained using data only
for the period 1999-2007. Significance levels: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, and * = 10%.
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Table 5: Bunching Persistence Over Time: Regression Results
Dependent Variable: Pr [bin (yt) = bin (yt+h)]
h=1 h=2 h=3 h=4 h=5 h=6 h=7 h=8
BunchBin .063*** .032*** .021*** .017*** .010*** .009*** .005* .003
(.003) (.003) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.003) (.003)
Constant .084*** .055*** .042*** .036*** .032*** .027*** .017*** .013***
(.002) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Obs. 668,943 590,124 519,773 444,343 369,329 300,291 238,778 182,878
Clusters 141,589 129,900 120,928 109,704 97,010 85,021 74,545 64,103
R2 0.023 0.015 0.011 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.007
Note: this table reports coeﬃcients from the following regression equation:
Prob [bin (yit) = bin (yi,t+h)] = α+ βBunchBinit + yit + y
2
it + λt + εit,
where yit is reported revenue by firm i in year t, the left-hand side variable is the fraction of
firms that report revenues in the same bin in years t and t + h, BunchBinit takes value one if
yit ∈ (5.75, 6], and λt denotes a vector of year dummies. We add a quadratic polynomial in current
reported revenue as a way to control for the counterfactual probability that firms remain in a given
revenue bin. Instead of using revenue levels, we use the distance to the notch so that the constant
term α can be interpreted as the fraction of firms near the notch expected to remain at their current
revenue level h years from now. These estimations use data for the full period 1999-2011.
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Figures
Figure 1: Theoretical Revenue Distribution
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Note: this figure depicts the theoretical revenue distribution before and after the introduction of
the Large Taxpayers’ Unit (LTU). In the benchmark scenario, all firms face the same probability of
detection and the distribution of revenue is smoothly decreasing as depicted by the dashed (black)
line. When the LTU is introduced, firms reporting revenue above yLTU face a higher enforcement
intensity. A group of firms in an interval above yLTU respond to the new policy by underreporting
more of their revenue to report exactly y¯ = yLTU . This generates a spike at the threshold (with
excess mass B), and an area of missing mass (H) to the right of the threshold, as depicted by the
solid (red) line. Notice that this plot assumes that there are no optimization frictions, so all firms
can immediately respond to fiscal incentives. Thus, there are no firms in the interval of length dy
above the threshold.
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Figure 2: Operating Revenue Distribution
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Note: the histograms pool data for the period 1999-2007. The dashed (blue) line indicates the
External Audit threshold, set at €4.75 million. The solid (red) line indicates the LTU threshold,
set at €6 million. The bins are exactly €42,070 wide and are defined such that no bin contains
data both to the left and to the right of each threshold.
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Figure 3: Counterfactual Distribution & Bunching Estimates
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Note: these graphs shows the reported distribution of revenue (dots connected by solid blue line)
and the estimated counterfactual (orange dashed curve) for the period 1999-2007. The data for the
true distribution are exactly the same as that used to construct the histogram in Figure 2. The
vertical dotted blue lines indicated the bounds of the excluded region (ylb and yub) chosen for the
estimation of the counterfactual. To determine the value of yub, we fit a polynomial regression to
the true density multiple times, starting with yub ≈ yLTU and increasing the value in small steps
until we reach a point where the bunching mass (B) equals the missing mass (H). This way, the
area under the counterfactual density is the same as under the true density. “b_NF” denotes the
estimate of bunching intensity derived under the assumption of no optimization frictions (bNF ), and
“b_F” denotes the estimate that takes into account the existence of frictions (bF ).
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Figure 4: Revenue Distribution by Sector of Activity
(a) High Bunching Sectors
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(b) Medium Bunching Sectors
b_NF = 0.095 (0.010)
b_F  = 0.457 (0.099)
0
10
0
20
0
30
0
40
0
Nu
m
be
r o
f F
irm
s
3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Revenue (million Euros)
Actual Density Counterfactual Density
N=19211
Manufacturing − Metallic Products
b_NF = 0.086 (0.009)
b_F  = 0.441 (0.085)
0
10
0
20
0
30
0
40
0
50
0
Nu
m
be
r o
f F
irm
s
3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Revenue (million Euros)
Actual Density Counterfactual Density
N=26408
Manufacturing − Wood and Paper Products
(c) Low Bunching Sectors
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Note: these graphs show the actual and counterfactual revenue distributions for selected sectors
(six out of a total of 12 sectors defined). The counterfactual distribution is constructed in each case
as explained in the note to Figure 3. Only data for the period 1999-2007 is used.
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Figure 5: Bunching Response by Scope of Evasion
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Note: the bunching measure b̂NF is calculated for each sector as explained in Section 4 in the
main text. Final consumption as a share of total sales in a sector is calculated using the year 2000
input-output tables for the Spanish economy, published by the National Statistics Institute (INE).
The assumption underlying this figure is thst selling to final consumers makes underreporting much
easier because the VAT self-enforcing mechanism breaks down at the last stage of the value chain.
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Figure 6: Growing vs. Shrinking Firms
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
De
ns
ity
3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Revenue (million Euros), Year t
Note: pooled 1999−2011 data
N=242305
(Revenue_t > Revenue_t−1)
Growing firms
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
De
ns
ity
3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Revenue (million Euros), Year t
Note: pooled 1999−2011 data
N=124978
(Revenue_t < Revenue_t−1)
Shrinking firms
Note: these graphs show annual revenue distributions for two subsamples of firms: those that are
growing and those that are shrinking. A firm is defined as growing if its reported revenue in year
t is higher than in year t − 1, i.e. yt > yt−1. A firm is defined as shrinking if its reported revenue
in year t is lower than in year t − 1, i.e. yt < yt−1. The dashed (blue) line indicates the External
Audit threshold, set at €4.75 for 1999-2007 and €5.7 million for 2008-2011. The solid (red) line
indicates the LTU threshold, set at €6 million for both periods (and fixed in nominal terms). The
bins are exactly €42,070 wide and are defined such that no bin contains data both to the left and to
the right of each threshold. The graphs pool data for the entire period 1999-2011, but the pattern
is consistent in both 1999-2007 and 2008-2011.
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Figure 7: Dynamic Behavior around the LTU Threshold
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Note: the left panel shows the probability that firms report higher revenues in year t + 1 than
t, against reported revenue in year t. The right panel shows median growth in reported revenue
experienced by firms in year t + 1, against reported revenue in year t. Data are divided in bins
of €200,000. The dots depict bin averages, while the solid lines in the left panel are quadratic
fits estimated separately on either side of the threshold. The dashed lines indicate 95% confidence
intervals around the quadratic fits.
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Figure 8: Bunching Persistence
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Note: these graphs show the degree of bunching persistence. Data are divided in €250,000 bins
such that no bin includes firm both to the left and to the right of the threshold, marked by the
dashed (red) vertical line. The blue dots indicate the proportion of firms who reported revenues
within that bin both in year t and year t+h, where h is the number of years. The solid red curve is
a quadratic fit of the bin averages, excluding the bunching bin, i.e. the interval of reported revenue
y ∈ (5.75, 6].
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Figure 9: Material Input Costs
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Note: this graph shows average material input costs over revenue by ranges of reported revenuefor
the period 1999-2007. Data are divided in €250,000 bins such that no bin includes firms both to
the left and to the right of the LTU threshold, which is marked by the dashed (red) vertical line.
The dots depict bin averages and the dashed lines are 95% confidence intervals. We trim outliers
in the data by dropping the top and bottom 0.5% of observations for the outcome variable.
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Figure 10: Labor Input Costs
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Note: this graph shows average labor input costs over revenue by ranges of reported revenue for the
period 1999-2007. The data are divided in €250,000 bins such that no bin includes firms both to
the left and to the right of the LTU threshold, which is marked by the dashed (red) vertical line.
The dots depict bin averages and the dashed lines are 95% confidence intervals. We trim outliers
in the data by dropping the top and bottom 0.5% of observations for the outcome variable.
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Figure 11: Number of Employees and Average Wages
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Note: these graphs show average number of employees (top panel) and average gross wages (bottom
panel) by ranges of reported revenue for the period 1999-2007. The data are divided in €250,000
bins such that no bin includes firms both to the left and to the right of the LTU threshold, which
is marked by the dashed (red) vertical line. The dots depict bin averages and the dashed lines are
95% confidence intervals. We trim outliers in the data by dropping the top and bottom 0.5% of
observations for the outcome variable.
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Appendix: Not Intended for Publication
A Model Extensions
The model in Section 2 assumes that there is only one production input, m, and one tax,
the corporate income tax. In that model, firms can only respond to tax enforcement regula-
tions by modifying their reported revenue through changes in output (real response) or by
misreporting their revenue to evade the corporate income tax (evasion response). Here, we
enrich this theoretical framework in several ways. In a first extension, we allow firms to also
misreport their input costs, besides misreporting their sales. Overreporting input costs can
be advantageous because it lowers reported profits and therefore the overall tax bill if the
firm is not detected. Once input misreporting has been added to the model, a natural step
is to include in the model the value added tax (VAT), which creates additional incentives
to overreport inputs. The second extension is to consider a production function with two
inputs: labor and materials. Considering these two inputs is interesting because the tax
incentives associated with each of these inputs are diﬀerent. It is also convenient because
the dataset we use includes accurate measures of firms’ total expenditures on both of them.
We begin by setting up the two model extensions and explaining how the setup of the
firm’s maximization problem changes firm incentives. Then, we summarize the testable
predictions generated by the two models, focusing in particular on the behavior of firms
around the LTU threshold.
A.1 Model with Input Overreporting
Consider a situation in which firms have two ways of manipulating their taxable income:
they can underreport their sales and overreport their input costs. Both activities lead to
a reduction in reported profits, and hence to a lower tax payment if not detected. Let
u = y − y denote the amount of sales underreported and let v = m − m be the amount
of inputs overreported. Notice that u ≥ 0 and v ≥ 0 by construction, because it is never
beneficial for firms to overreport sales or underreport inputs (they would pay higher taxes
without receiving any additional benefit). In this setting, true and reported before-tax profits
are given by:
Π = pψf (m)− cm (20)
Π = p [ψf (m)− u]− c [m+ v] (21)
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The tax authority monitors firms to detect tax evasion behavior and tax audits always
uncover the full amount of taxes evaded. As before, let θ be the penalty rate applied to the
amount of evasion detected and let δ denote that probability of evasion detection, which is a
convex function of total firm output, sales underreporting and input overreporting. Formally,
we have δ = δ (m, u, v) with:
∂δ/∂m > 0 ∂2δ/∂m2 > 0
∂δ/∂u > 0 ∂2δ/∂u2 > 0
∂δ/∂v > 0 ∂2δ/∂v2 > 0
Firms choose material inputs, m, underreported sales, u, and overreported inputs, v, to
maximize expected profits, subject to the technological constraint, prices given by competi-
tive markets and tax enforcement policies. Expected profits are then given by:
EΠ = Π− tΠ− δt (1 + θ)
[
Π− Π
]
(22)
where the diﬀerence between true and reported profits can be written as follows:
Π− Π = pu+ cv ≥ 0 (23)
The first order conditions for an interior optimum are given by:
(1− t) pψfm (m
∗) = (1− t) c+ t (1 + θ)
∂δ
∂m
[pu+ cv] (24)
tc = t (1 + θ)
[
∂δ
∂v
[pu+ cv∗] + δc
]
(25)
tp = t (1 + θ)
[
∂δ
∂u
[pu ∗+cv] + δp
]
(26)
Equation (24) shows that when either u > 0 or v > 0, optimal input purchases are
aﬀected by the possibility of tax evasion. Firms buy less inputs than in an economy without
tax evasion because the possibility of evasion raises the marginal cost of acquiring inputs.
The next two equations characterize the optimal misreporting choices: input overreporting
and sales underreporting. According to condition (25), firms equalize the marginal tax
savings of overreporting input costs to the marginal expected payment if detected. According
to condition (26), firms equalize that marginal tax savings of underreporting sales to the
marginal expected payment if detected.
Solving (25) and (26) for v∗ and u∗ and introducing them into (24), we obtain the following
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expressions:
∂δ/∂v
∂δ/∂m
=
tc [1− δ (1 + θ)]
(1− t) [pψfm (m∗)− c]
(27)
∂δ/∂u
∂δ/∂m
=
tp [1− δ (1 + θ)]
(1− t) [pψfm (m∗)− c]
(28)
where tc [1− δ (1 + θ)] and tp [1− δ (1 + θ)] are the expected marginal returns of input over-
reporting and sales underreporting, respectively. Condition (27) indicates that the relative
increase in the detection probability due to a higher use of inputs (more production) and a
higher amount of input overreporting (more evasion) must be equal to the relative return
between evading taxes and acquiring inputs. Condition (28) has a similar interpretation,
but with the additional evasion coming from revenue underreporting.
The key intuition obtained from this extension of the model is that firms can evade taxes
through two symmetric channels, sales underreporting and input overreporting. In the first
order conditions, one additional euro of sales underreporting leads to the same tax evasion
as one additional euro of inputs overreporting. However, this symmetry breaks down when
firms are close to the LTU threshold, because sales underreporting can determine whether
the firm faces high or low enforcement, whereas the amount of inputs reported does not.
Because of the discontinuity in enforcement, bunching firms are at a corner solution, so their
optimum is not characterized by the first order conditions.
Introducing the value-added tax
To make the model more applicable to the context under study, we introduce the value-
added tax (VAT) into the model. The VAT is designed to be a tax on consumption, with
firms playing the role of fiscal intermediaries that help in the process of tax collection. VAT
is charged on every business transaction, regardless of whether a sale is made to a final
consumer or to a firm as an intermediate input. At the end of the fiscal period (usually a
month or a quarter), firms calculate all the VAT they have charged on their sales and all
the VAT they have paid on their inputs and remit to the tax agency the diﬀerence between
the two. If the balance is negative, then the firm receives a reimbursement. Absent other
distortions and assuming that firms report their transactions truthfully, the VAT does not
distort productive eﬃciency. To show this in a simple way, it is convenient to introduce some
additional notation and work only with monetary amounts. Let Y = pψf (m) denote total
revenue from sales and let M = cm denote total input costs. True after-tax profits under
truthful reporting with both a corporate income tax and a VAT are:
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Π =
(
1− tcit
) [(
1 + tvat
)
(Y −M)− tvat (Y −M)
]
=
(
1− tcit
)
[Y −M ] (29)
where tcit is the corporate income tax rate and tvat is the value-added tax rate. When
misreporting of either revenues or input costs is allowed, the neutrality of VAT is broken.
By engaging in misreporting, the firm takes advantage of its role as a fiscal intermediary and
keeps some resources that should have been transferred to the government as part of the
VAT collection process. Actual profits obtained by the firm when misreporting is allowed
and the firm is not detected (ND) are:
ΠND =
(
1− tcit
) {(
1 + tvat
) (
Y −M
)
− tvat
(
Y −M
)}
+ (U + V )
=
(
1− tcit
)
[Y −M ] +
(
tcit + tvat
)
(U + V ) (30)
As in previous versions of the model, the tax agency detects the evasion behavior with some
probability δ and applies a penalty rate θ. Profits obtained by the firm when evasion is
detected are:
ΠD =
(
1− tcit
)
[Y −M ]− (1 + θ)
(
tcit + tvat
)
(U + V ) (31)
Therefore, the expression for expected profits is similar to previous ones, with the additional
incentive to evade due to the VAT:
EΠ =
(
1− tcit
)
[Y −M ] + [1− δ (1 + θ)]
(
tcit + tvat
)
(U + V ) (32)
With equation (32) as an objective function, one can derive the solution of the model
as before by simply defining total evasion E as the sum of sales underreporting and input
overreporting: E = U + V .
A.2 Model with Two Production Inputs
Up to this point, all the models we have worked with allow firms to use only one production
input. This restriction is clearly unrealistic, because in practice firms use a variety of inputs
in the production process. Interestingly for the context of this paper, the tax incentives are
not the same for diﬀerent production inputs. In this extension, we consider a model with two
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production inputs: materials and labor. To match the aggregated definitions of inputs in
the Amadeus data, we consider material inputs to include both raw materials and external
services used for production. The measure of labor inputs is the total wage bill of the firm.
Let N = wn denote the total wage bill, where w is the market wage rate and n is the
number of employees. Also, let tprt be the statutory payroll tax rate. As explained above,
Spanish Law assigns part of the payroll tax to the employer and part to the employee.
Ultimately, the incidence of the tax is an empirical question unrelated to the statutory
taxes, so we abstract from this and use a single tax rate that includes both the employer’s
and the employee’s share. True after-tax profits are then given by:
Π =
(
1− tcit
) {(
1 + tvat
)
[Y −M ]− tvat [Y −M ]−
(
1 + tprt
)
N
}
=
(
1− tcit
) {
[Y −M ]−
(
1 + tprt
)
N
}
(33)
Equation (33) yields some standard results. First, neither the corporate income tax
nor the VAT distort production decisions when there truthful reporting. The payroll does
increase the marginal cost of labor, so it leads to a suboptimally low employment level in
equilibrium.
We now allow for the possibility of misreporting labor costs, letting Z = N −N denote
underreported labor costs. In this case, after-tax profits when evasion is not detected are
given by:
ΠND =
(
1− tcit
) {(
1 + tvat
) [
Y −M
]
− tvat
[
Y −M
]
−
(
1 + tprt
)
N
}
+ (U + V − Z)
=
(
1− tcit
)
{Y −M −N} +
(
tcit + tvat
)
(U + V ) +
[
tprt − tcit
(
1 + tprt
)]
Z (34)
Profits if detected by the tax authorities are derived in a similar way:
ΠD =
(
1− tcit
)
{Y −M −N}−
− (1 + θ)
{(
tcit + tvat
)
(U + V ) +
[
tprt − tcit
(
1 + tprt
)]
Z
}
(35)
Finally, we obtain the usual expression for expected profits that firms try to maximize:
EΠ =
(
1− tcit
)
[Y −M −N ] +
+ [1− δ (1 + θ)]
{(
tcit + tvat
)
(U + V ) +
[
tprt − tcit
(
1 + tprt
)]
Z
}
(36)
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Material inputs are deductible under the value added tax (VAT) and the corporate in-
come tax (CIT). Hence, overreporting material inputs unambiguously lowers the amount of
VAT and CIT remitted to the government (if not detected). There is widespread anecdotal
evidence of firms overreporting materials inputs in Spain. For example, firms tend to include
personal expenditures of CEOs and senior management into the company books. There are
multiple reports of this practice with durable goods such as automobiles (which are really
intended for personal use) and also with large social events such as weddings (reported as
company events).
Labor inputs cannot be deducted from the VAT, but they are instead taxed through the
payroll tax. Underreporting labor inputs lowers the amount of payroll tax remitted, but
it increases tax liability on the CIT. Therefore, the incentive to over- or underreport labor
inputs depends on the relative marginal tax rates of the payroll tax and the CIT. Specifically,
underreporting is advantageous as long as tprt < tcit (1 + tprt). In the period we study, the
tax rates were tprt = 38% and tcit = 35% (reduced to 30% in 2007). Applying these rates
to the formula yields a small incentive to overreport labor costs.40 However, there are two
important factors in favor of underreporting of labor costs that this model does not capture:
potential collusion with workers and downward wage rigidities. We explain how these two
factors work below.
If wages are underreported, employees face a lower personal income tax than they would
with truthful reporting. Even though they also lose some potential future benefits like higher
pensions and unemployment insurance payments, those are small compared to the savings
from evading income taxes today. Hence, we argue that there are strong incentives for wage
earners to collude with their employers to underreport wages. Evidence on this practice
among firms is widespread in Spain41 and other countries.42
Downward nominal wage rigidity provides an additional reason for firms to underreport
wages. In good years, firms would like to raise their employees’ wages, but they know that
in bad years it will be extremely diﬃcult to lower in a symmetric way due to the power
of unions and an inflexible collective bargaining system. In this context, firms can use the
40With tcit = 35%, the marginal return on each euro of labor costs underreported would be 0.38 −
0.35 (1.38) = −0.10. With the lower tax rate of 30%, the return gets closer to zero: 0.38 − 0.30 ∗ (1.38) =
−0.034. A marginal corporate income tax rate of 27.3% would make firms indiﬀerent between over- and
underreporting labor costs. After the CIT reform in 2007, tcit = 25% for firms with reported revenue below
€8 million.
41For example, there are open judicial investigations on the political party currently in power at the national
level and on the vice-president of the National Employers Federation for paying salary “complements” in cash.
42Kumler, Verhoogen and Frias (2012) provide evidence of wage underreporting in Mexico, where many
firms report payments barely above the minimum wage to evade payroll taxes, while average and median
wages reported in household surveys are two or three times above the reported amounts.
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cash revenues obtained through unreported sales to give wage “bonuses” to their employees
in good times, and pay them only their oﬃcial salary in bad years.
A.3 Theoretical Predictions
In deriving testable predictions from the models presented above, we make the assumption
that a random subset of firms is aﬀected by optimization frictions. This means that these
firms are not able to respond to the incentives around the LTU threshold by misreporting
their activities. Even though we have not modeled optimization frictions explicitly up to
this point, we know from the empirical revenue distribution shown in Section 4 that they
are substantial because many firms report revenues just above the LTU threshold.
Understanding the use of production inputs by firms above and below the threshold can
shed light on what type of behavioral response is dominant. We use the model extensions
presented above to derive predictions of how the reported input costs would look like un-
der several scenarios. Assuming that there are optimization frictions is necessary for this
predictions to make sense, because otherwise there would be no firms at all just above the
threshold. Another assumption, implicit in our production function, is that the ratios of
inputs over revenue are constant for all levels of revenue. This is not exactly true in the
data, but it is a good approximation for short intervals around the LTU threshold.
Model with One Input
In the model with one production input and two taxes (corporate income and VAT), the
predictions are straightforward. If the bunching response is fully real, concavity of the
production function f (m) implies that firms just below the threshold must use (and hence
report) lower input costs on average. This is because bunching firms are more productive
than those that would have been below the notch even in the absence of the LTU. The firms
that do not respond to the incentives because of optimization frictions and remain just above
the notch report a higher input/revenue ratio than the bunching firms. To sum up, if the
bunching response is through a decline in production, we should observe an upward jump in
the input/revenue ratio at the LTU threshold.
If the response is fully due to evasion, bunching firms obtain revenues above €6 million
but report a smaller amount. Assuming bunching firms report inputs truthfully, the reported
ratio of inputs over revenue would be relatively high. If they also overreport input costs (to
take advantage of the lower enforcement intensity), the reported ratio will be even higher.
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Thus, the model with sales underreporting and input overreporting predicts a downward
jump in the input/revenue ratio at the LTU threshold.
Model with Two Inputs
In the model with two inputs (materials and labor) and two taxes (corporate income and
VAT), the predictions for the ratio of material inputs over total revenue are the same as for
a single input. If the response is fully real, we should observe an upward jump in the ratio at
the LTU threshold, because bunching firms are relatively more productive. If the response is
fully due to revenue underreporting, we should observe a downward jump in the ratio, larger
if bunching firms also overreport their materials.
The predictions for the ratio of labor costs over revenue are less clear-cut. Under a fully
real response, the prediction is the same as for materials: we should observe an upward
jump in the ratio of labor costs over revenue at the LTU threshold. If the bunching response
is fully due to evasion and there is no misreporting of labor costs, then we would expect
a downward jump in the ratio. Once we allow for labor cost misreporting, the incentives
depend on the corporate income and payroll tax rates as explained above, apart from the
other incentives for underreporting discussed (potential for collusion and downward nominal
wage rigidity). Thus, the prediction in the latter case is ambiguous.
B Institutional Background and Data: Additional De-
tails
B.1 Overview of the Spanish Tax System
The Spanish tax system rests on four main taxes: the payroll tax (PRT),43 the individual
income tax (IIT), the value-added tax (VAT) and the corporate income tax (CIT). The
payroll tax accounted for a stable 33% of all tax revenues in the period 1999-2011, followed
by the IIT with 22%, the VAT with 19%, and the CIT with 13% (the latter with wide
fluctuations between 15% in boom years and 9% in recession years). The rest is collected
through other indirect taxes and fees (IEF, 2011).
The top marginal tax rate on the individual income tax (IIT) in Spain was 48% in
1999-2002 and then lowered to 46% in 2003-2011. This rate is substantially higher rate
43In Spain these are known as Social Security Contributions (“Cotizaciones Sociales”), but the term can
be confusing because Social Security includes multiple social protection programs, not just pensions and
disability insurance as in the United States.
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than the 35% (lowered to 30% in 2007) tax rate of the corporate income tax, which is 5
percentage points lower for firms under a revenue threshold that has changed over time.
Thus, unlike in the US, high-income individuals have an incentive to shift taxable income
from the IIT base to the CIT base to lower their tax liability. This seems to have led to
the creation an abnormally large number of small firms in this period. The payroll tax rate
was 38%, adding up the rates assigned to employers (31%) and employees (7%). Since wage
negotiations usually focus on the net-of-tax wage, this is the most natural way of thinking
about the overall payroll tax rate.44 The general VAT rate in Spain during 1999-2010 was
16% (increased to 18% for 2010-11), with reduced rates for some goods and services.45 The
VAT is collected by firms at each production stage and then remitted to the government.
Penalties for tax evasion vary depending on the size of the infraction. If the amount
evaded is above €120,000 (€90,000 prior to 2004), then the taxpayer faces criminal respon-
sibility, whereas if it is below there can only be administrative penalties. There is a great
deal of discretion regarding penalties, which according to law could go from 50% to 600% of
the amount evaded, depending on the gravity of the oﬀense. Fiscal crimes legally prescribe
after four years, which in some cases limits the tax agency’s ability to recover fiscal debts
because the legal process is too slow.46
B.2 Data
As noted in the main text, small firms are under-represented in the Amadeus dataset. We
assess the representativity of the sample by comparing the number of firms in Amadeus to
the oﬃcial statistics of the corporate income tax. The numbers on Table 6 confirm that small
firms are under-represented in Amadeus (less than 50% compared to oﬃcial statistics). On
the other hand, more than 80% of firms with reported revenue between €3 and €9 million,
which are the focus of our empirical analysis, are included in Amadeus.
Another limitation of the Amadeus data, common to the corporate tax literature, is that
the financial statements do not provide an accurate measure of actual tax liability, because
we do not observe the tax deductions applied by each firm to arrive at fiscal profit.47 To know
the exact tax liability, we would need administrative tax return data for all the major taxes,
44We do not get into the question of who bears the tax burden of the tax, since there is also a debate
about the incidence of the corporate income tax itself.
45There were two reduced rates of 7 and 4% for items like staple foods, medicine and culture-related goods
and services. Education and financial services were fully exempted from VAT.
46On the other hand, the tax inspector can request financial statements from the previous four years during
an audit, and the company is legally obliged to provide them.
47The dataset does include a self-reported estimation of corporate income tax liability.
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which is not available to researchers. Aggregate data published by the tax agency (AEAT,
Several years) shows that the eﬀective corporate tax rate paid by small and medium firms
is higher than that of very large ones (25% vs. 22%), even though the statutory rate is
higher for the latter group (30% vs. 35%). This indicates that tax deductions are of second-
order importance for the size range we study. The information submitted to the Commercial
Registry is essentially the starting point of the tax return, and the amount must match
exactly.
B.2.1 Sectors of Activity: Definitions
TBD
C Empirical Results for the Recession Period, 2008-2011
C.1 Revenue Distribution
Figure 15 shows that the distribution of reported revenue is quite diﬀerent for the recession
period 2008-2011. First, the amount of bunching below the LTU threshold is substantially
smaller than in the previous period, although still visible. Second, the External Audit
threshold moved from €4.75 to €5.7 million, as indicated by the blue vertical dashed line.
There is some bunching of firms at the new External Audit threshold, while the distribution
is smooth over the old threshold. The fact that the two thresholds are much closer in this
later period complicates the estimation, as explained below.
Figures 13 and 14 show the bunching pattern for each individual year in the periods
1999-2007 and 2008-2011, respectively. The distribution of reported revenue is remarkably
stable and similar to the pooled data in the first period, with slightly noisier patterns given
the smaller sample sizes. In the second period, the bunching response is consistently small
every year, although 2009 stands out because there is no discernible bunching below the
LTU threshold. That year the Spanish economy shrank by 3.7% and a very large share of
firms faced negative (reported) revenue growth.
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Appendix Tables
Table 6: Amadeus Dataset Compared to Oﬃcial Statistics
All Firms €0-€3 million €3-€10 million €10+ million
1999
Oﬃcial 792,973 752,698 28,476 10,798
Amadeus 250,385 31.6% 218,429 29.0% 23,144 81.3% 8,812 81.6%
2000
Oﬃcial 876,530 828,082 34,014 14,433
Amadeus 286,837 32.7% 249,401 30.1% 26,688 78.5% 10,748 74.5%
2001
Oﬃcial 928,897 874,992 37,382 16,523
Amadeus 370,174 39.9% 328,040 37.5% 29,885 79.9% 12,249 74.1%
2002
Oﬃcial 1,008,744 951,152 40,388 17,204
Amadeus 444,215 44.0% 398,015 41.8% 32,887 81.4% 13,312 77.4%
2003
Oﬃcial 1,041,527 979,918 43,246 18,363
Amadeus 488,076 46.9% 437,670 44.7% 35,730 82.6% 14,676 79.9%
2004
Oﬃcial 1,117,005 1,050,143 46,806 20,056
Amadeus 523,405 46.9% 468,128 44.6% 39,023 83.4% 16,252 81.0%
2005
Oﬃcial 1,200,267 1,126,588 51,062 22,617
Amadeus 583,992 48.7% 522,679 46.4% 43,139 84.5% 18.168 80.3%
2006
Oﬃcial 1,293,419 1,210,736 56,952 25,731
Amadeus 664,679 51.4% 594,443 49.1% 49,265 86.5% 20,966 81.5%
2007
Oﬃcial 1,410,188 1,321,500 60,699 27,989
Amadeus 610,974 43.3% 539,977 40.9% 49,148 81.0% 21,843 78.0%
2008
Oﬃcial 1,417,906 1,335,081 57,401 25424
Amadeus 656,511 46.3% 593,336 44.4% 43,247 75.3% 19,924 78.4%
2009
Oﬃcial 1,414,877 1,347,188 46,113 21,576
Amadeus 576,576 40.8% 526,623 39.1% 33,490 72.6% 16,462 76.3%
2010 Amadeus 629,201 n/a 577,064 n/a 34,714 n/a 17,419 n/a
2011 Amadeus 503,120 n/a 462,488 n/a 27,138 n/a 13,489 n/a
Note: The percentages indicate the proportion of firms with complete revenue data in Amadeus
compared to the number of firms that submitted a corporate income tax return that year. Oﬃcial
statistics are from several issues of “Memoria de Administración Tributaria”, an annual report
published by the Spanish tax agency (AEAT, Several years). Oﬃcial data for the years 2010 and
2011 are not yet publicly available. The Amadeus dataset is described in detail in section 3.2.
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Table 7: Overview of the Spanish Tax System
Top tax rate Share of tax revenue
Social Security Contributions (SSC) 38% 33%
Individual Income Tax (IIT) 48% (46%) 22%
Value-Added Tax (VAT) 16% 19%
Corporate Income Tax (CIT) 35% (30%) 13%
Other indirect taxes and fees - 13%
Federal Tax Revenue / GDP 30-37%
Sources: Instituto de Estudios Fiscales (IEF, 2011). The top marginal rate of the individual income
tax was reduced to 46% 2005. The top marginal rate of the corporate income tax was reduced to
32.5% in 2006 and 30% in 2007. The data on tax revenues reflects averages for the period 1999-2007
and include regional-level revenues in all calculations.
Table 8: Bunching Estimation by Year, 2008-2011
bNF bF B H ylb yub N
Pooled data
2008-2011 .028*** .215*** 476.1 556.8 5.50 6.30 122,521
(.004) (.043)
Annual data
2008 .046*** .225*** 240.8 268.5 5.50 6.30 37,393
(.006) (.043)
2009 .017** .309 75.4 85.6 5.50 6.42 31,430
(.008) (.443)
2010 .014** .105 58.2 81.9 5.50 6.18 30,191
(.006) (.061)
2011 .028*** .200*** 95.1 118.8 5.50 6.30 23,507
(.009) (.087)
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Appendix Figures
Figure 12: Behavioral (Non)response at the Corporate Income Tax Threshold
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Figure 14: Revenue Distribution, Year by Year, 2008-2011
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Note: this figure shows annual histograms of reported revenue for each year in the period 2008-2011.
The distribution is very similar for all years, with some noise due to the fact that these subsamples
are relatively small. The dashed (blue) line indicates the External Audit threshold, set at €5.7
million during 2008-2011. The solid (red) line indicates the LTU threshold, set at €6 million for
both periods (and fixed in nominal terms). The bins are exactly €42,070 wide and are defined such
that no bin contains data both to the left and to the right of each threshold.
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Figure 13: Revenue Distribution Year by Year, 1999-2007
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Note: this figure shows annual histograms of reported revenue for each year in the period 1999-2007. The dashed (blue) line indicates the
External Audit threshold, set at €4.75 million during 1999-2007. The solid (red) line indicates the LTU threshold, set at €6 million for
both periods (and fixed in nominal terms). The bins are exactly €42,070 wide and are defined such that no bin contains data both to
the left and to the right of each threshold.
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Figure 15: Operating Revenue Distribution, period 2008-2011
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Figure 16: Exporters vs. Non-Exporters
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Figure 17: Revenue Distribution by Number of Employees
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Note: these graphs show the actual and counterfactual revenue distributions for subsamples of firms
with a given number of employees. The counterfactual distributions are constructed as explained
in the note to Figure 3. Only data for the period 1999-2007 is used.
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Figure 18: Revenue Distribution by Fixed Assets
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Note: these graphs show the actual and counterfactual revenue distributions for subsamples of firms
with a given level of fixed assets (measured in million Euros). The counterfactual distributions are
constructed as explained in the note to Figure 3. Only data for the period 1999-2007 is used.
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Figure 19: Revenue Distribution by Organizational Form
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Note: these graphs show the actual and counterfactual revenue distributions for firms with diﬀerent
organizational forms. SL stands for Sociedad Limited , equivalent to a Limited Liability Company.
SA stands for Sociedad Anónima, equivalent to a Corporation. The counterfactual distribution is
constructed in each case as explained in the note to Figure 3. Only data for the period 1999-2007
is used.
72
Figure 20: Bunching Intensity by Region
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Note: this maps represents the 17 Autonomous Regions of Spain. We use a color scale to show
the diﬀerent bunching intensity observed in the revenue distribution in each region, according to
the bunching parameter bNF . Lighter (yellow) tones apply to low bunching regions, while darker
tones (red) denote high-bunching regions. The lowest bunching is observed in Navarra and País
Vasco, the two regions in the North where the Large Taxpayers’ Unit (LTU) only applies to a some
firms (those that operate extensively in the rest of the country). For the other regions, the pattern
is: relatively low bunching in the Northern and Eastern regions (Cataluña, Aragón, Valencia and
Baleares) and relatively high bunching in the South, Center and North-West.
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